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Abstract
The lofty idea of equal justice for all is not the reason legal aid began in the United
States. Legal aid was born from the indignation over injustices committed against the poor.
Unable to afford an attorney, the poor could not effectively assert their rights within the
criminal and civil justice system. Without access to justice through the courts, the extralegal
activities required to defend oneself and exact justice such as personally forcing an employer to
pay rightful wages, are deemed criminal in most cases. By providing legal resources to the
poor, legal aid not only brought order to society by preventing lawlessness, but it protected the
rights of the poor as citizens. The chronological history of legal services in America, from the
first legal aid program, Der Deutsche Rechts Schutzverein in 1876, to the merger in 1964 of the
89-year legal aid movement and the two-year old reform movement, which formed the
federally-funded Legal Services Program (LSP) during the War on Poverty, shows the
proliferation of legal aid societies in urban areas across the nation.
Under the Great Society’s Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) and the LSP, legal aid
greatly expanded with the use of discretionary government funding. During the mid-1960s and
early 1970s Legal Services programs showed great promise in eliminating the barriers that kept
the poor entrenched in poverty. With the use of national “back-up centers”, the Reginald
Heber Smith (Reggie) program and other initiatives, legal aid programs created a nation-wide
network designed to help the poor with more than just their legal problems. Programs used
class actions, legislative advocacy, and threat of attorney’s fees to reform laws and attack the
very institutions afflicting the poor. As the history of legal aid in America becomes more
apparent, the LSP looks more like an aberration, especially considering the previous eighty-nine
iii

years of legal aid as strictly a privately-funded affair. Designed to fight a war on poverty, LSP
awarded grants to the majority of established legal aid societies, but because their boards and
directors held fast to the traditional idea of legal services they were reluctant to use law reform
to correct injustices. Reluctant board members, directors and those who ran the programs, in
tandem with local bars, the unenthusiastic American Bar Association, and powerful business
and political opponents ultimately eliminated law reform; as such, an opportunity to truly help
the poor during the last decades of the twentieth century was lost.
Access to Justice is less a “right” today than it was in the 1960s. Since the advent of the
Legal Services Corporation (LSC) in 1974, the quality of legal services to the poor has steadily
diminished.1 The conservative view that legal aid is a form of unnecessary welfare and
unnecessary interference by the federal government played a dominant role in the restrictions
placed on LSC funds during the Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan and Newt Gingrich eras. The
"Republican Revolution" in 1996 resulted in the greatest restrictions on funding and ultimately
ended the controversial "Support Centers" and "Reggie" program. These restrictions reflect the
historical concept of the “sturdy beggar” and the bygone philosophy that legal aid is a form of
charity; as such, they work to identify and restrict the able-bodied poor from receiving any type
of government aid, including legal services. LSC restrictions and initiatives promote the use of
alternative delivery methods such as Pro Bono and Pro Se that move field programs away from
quality legal services and suggest a return to the private charity days of the first legal aid
movement. Without quality programs that allow legal services attorneys unrestricted use of the

1

Quality is defined as a fitness for purpose. The LSC restrictions on legal aid programs diminished the capacity of
attorneys to fully represent all poor people, making them less fit to achieve their purpose of providing legal
services.

iv

tools available to private attorneys, America’s promise of justice for all will continue to exclude
the impoverished. The most heinous restriction, which places LSC restrictions on non-LSC funds
today, creates an unnecessary and expensive overlap of legal services in Nevada, making it
more difficult to coordinate the patchwork of legal services that comprise Nevada’s make-shift
civil Gideon.
The thesis includes interviews with those involved in legal aid in Nevada such as
Supreme Court Justice Michael Douglas, Former NLS Executive Directors Carolyn Worrell and
Wayne Pressel, Executive Director of NLS AnnaMarie Johnson, founder of Nevada Indian Legal
Services Charles Zeh, Director of Nevada Indian Legal Services Dick Olson, and legal aid attorney
and legislative advocate Jon Sasser. It utilizes the early work of Reginald Heber Smith, his book
Justice and the Poor, and former OEO Director Earl Johnson Jr’s publications, Justice and Reform
and To Establish Justice for All, to trace the growth and atrophy of legal representation for the
poor. The thesis extends our knowledge by providing a more current overview of LSC with
special emphasis on its Nevada Legal Services (NLS) program. The thesis also complements
Annelise Orleck’s study of Ruby Duncan and the welfare rights movement by putting legal
services in Nevada into great historical context.
According to Justice Michael Douglas, there is still a group in the public which does not
believe that legal aid is the work of a real attorney. This group argues that legal services
lawyers must be second-tier attorneys, because a successful first-tier attorney would never
choose legal aid as a career. Many of those interviewed such as Wayne Pressel, Jon Sasser and
others are still fighting, in their own unique way, a war on poverty, an idea anathema to the
American Bar Association, and the Legal Services Corporation today. Not only did these legal
v

aid leaders challenge the institutions that perpetuate poverty, they refuted the idea that legal
aid is a charity and through their work and talent disproved the second-tier attorney stigma
that extends to the “people’s lawyer” and the legal aid profession.
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The Legal Aid Movement

Denial of justice is the short cut to anarchy.
–Reginald Heber Smith, 1919

Introduction
By the late nineteenth century, the attorney was an indispensable figure of modern life
in America and a vital prerequisite for anyone caught up in the civil and criminal justice system.
Those who could not afford one had the task of representing themselves in court, which was
inadvisable, because representing oneself and navigating through changing laws and legal
procedure usually proved impossible. As a result, the poor rarely received justice. The first
legal aid societies were born out of indignation over the exploitations of the poor, usually at the
hand of lawyers representing the opposing party. Reformers responded to this with charity in
the form of legal aid. The ensuing legal aid movement and Congress at the time, considered
legal aid to be a charitable institution; it was not considered a government responsibility. With
the advent of Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society in the 1960s, America turned its attention to
poverty. Sargent Shriver’s Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) became a potential source of
federal funds for legal aid. Board members and directors of legal aid programs rejected the
idea. They argued against government involvement, holding to an eighty-nine year tradition of
private funding. It would take Shriver, Jean and Edgar Cahn, Lewis Powell, William McCaulpin
and other legal aid advocates to persuade Congress, the American Bar Association (ABA) and
the legal services programs to accept federal money. Thus legal aid grudgingly became a
matter of discretionary government funding and politics under the OEO Legal Services Program
(OEO-LSP). What the LSP was designed to do, how effective it was, and why it was ultimately

1

disbanded, depended upon whether those in need required assistance or were responsible for
their own needs; it hardly relied upon the idea of equal justice for the poor.
This chapter begins with Reginald Heber Smith and his book Justice for the Poor that
stimulated a conversation regarding equal justice for the impoverished which gained popularity
and sparked the legal aid movement. The chapter surveys America’s changing landscape and
the proliferation of legal aid societies across the nation beginning with the first one, Der
Deutsche Rechtsschutz Verein in 1876. It traces the movement’s progress leading up to the
formation of the federally-funded Legal Services Program launched in 1965. A brief review of
the landmark Gideon v. Wainwright decision and the right to an attorney in criminal matters
will demonstrate how civil legal matters for the poor became the primary responsibility of legal
aid. The chapter continues by describing how poverty became more visible in the 1960s and
how the legal aid movement attached itself to the OEO during President Johnson's "War on
Poverty." Finally, it explains how an eighty-nine-year-old legal aid movement met a two-yearold social reform movement to form the OEO-LSP with a dichotomous mission.

Legal Aid Pioneer
According to Justice Earl Johnson Jr., “until 1920, legal aid was provided by a loose,
unorganized collection of independent organizations located in a few of the country’s larger
cities.” But after that, “it emerged as something that could be called a movement, with a
measure of organization and a unifying national mission.”2 Johnson credits Reginald Heber
Smith and his book Justice and the Poor (1919) for the movement, marking his work as “the first

2

Earl Johnson Jr., Justice and Reform: The Formative Years of the OEO Legal Services Program (New York: Russell
Sage Foundation, 1974), 5.
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definitive treatment of inequality in the administration of justice.”3 Using case histories,
statistics, and potent language, Smith dispelled the myth that equal justice existed. “The
American justice system is not impartial, and the rich and poor do not stand on equality before
the law,”4 Smith avowed, "for the State to erect an uneven, partial administration of justice is
to abnegate the very responsibility for which it exists."5
To Smith, delay and costs denied justice to the poor. The time taken to receive final
judgment made it impractical to sue, and costs incurred for a host of services made litigation
unaffordable.6 Moreover, without proper representation, cases devolved into one-sided
arguments, wasting the court’s time. Smith urged simplified procedure, efficient
reorganization, and unification of the courts to help eliminate delay and to lower costs. For the
cost of counsel, he offered three solutions: attempt Pro Se by “representing one’s self”, make
the attorney’s services unnecessary, and/or provide assistance of counsel for those who could
not afford one. Thus, the essence of early legal aid work was to provide legal advice and
assistance to the poor through free representation, a service the courts vitally needed.
Smith published his book at an opportune time in America. The beginning of World
War I promised a “world safe for democracy”, but its end brought myriad labor strikes and
social turbulence, including virulent racism. The Bolshevik Revolution in Russia spawned

3

Johnson, 5.
Reginald Heber Smith, Justice and the Poor, a Study of the Present Denial of Justice to the Poor and of the
Agencies Making More Equal Their Position before the Law, with Particular Reference to Legal Aid Work in the
United States (New York: The Carnegie Foundation, 1919), 8.
5
Ibid., 5.
6
Delay and costs often denied justice to the poor. In one case over a wage claim the final judgment took one
year, nine months and eleven days. Fortunately, the judge ruled in favor of the wage-earner to collect a week’s
worth of wages owed, approximately $10.00. Costs and fee schedules differed from state to state and from court
to court, [Appellate, Supreme etc.] and fees were often incurred for a range of services including, docketing, filing,
searching and obtaining records, certifying or copying documents, and general processing. Smith suggested an allinclusive in forma pauperis statute, similar to that in the federal courts.
4
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growing fears over the spread of a godless communism and anarchism. At home, Socialist Party
candidate Eugene V. Debs attracted nearly a million votes in the presidential election of 1920.
The migration of families of Eastern European immigrants only exacerbated WASP fears about
class revolution, leading to quota acts in 1921 and 1924 that were not lifted until the Great
Society in 1966. All of these events impelled US Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer to enlist
the support of a young J. Edgar Hoover to conduct “Red Raids” to restore America to normalcy.
Against this backdrop of fear, of communism and socialism, Smith’s voice warned that “when
the law recognizes and enforces a distinction between classes, revolution ensues or democracy
is at an end.”7 Without access to justice for the poor, faith in democracy would fail. Smith, a
bellwether of justice for the poor, capitalized on present fears while harnessing an opportunity
for Americans to take action. Provide justice for all, he urged, if you don’t want anarchy.

The Need for Legal Aid
American philosopher, Ralph Waldo Emerson, wrote in 1841, “A good indignation brings
out all of one’s powers.”8 Smith believed that legal aid societies sprang, not from loftier ideas
of a right to justice, but from plain indignation. In 1876, Der Deutsche Rechtsschutz Verein, the
German Legal Aid Society in New York, hired an attorney to protect its immigrants from
“runners, boarding-house keepers, and a miscellaneous coterie of sharpers who found that the
trustful and bewildered newcomers offered an easy prey.” The first of its kind, the society
provided “legal aid and assistance, gratuitously, to those…who from poverty are unable to

7

Johnson, 6.
Ralph Waldo Emerson, 24 October 1841, Journal XXXII, From (From Journals E, G, H, and J),
The Ralph Waldo Emerson Journals Digital Archive, Volume 6 [From the 1904-14 Edition, Edward Emerson, General
Editor], presented by The Ralph Waldo Emerson Institute and RWE.org.
http://www.perfectidius.com/Volume_6_1842-1844.pdf
8
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procure it.”9 Eight years later, The Protective Agency for Women and Children opened in
Chicago, to protect women and children against “the great number of seductions and
debaucheries…under the guise of proffered employment.”10 Earl Johnson credits the Agency
with establishing the need to provide legal help for the poor in Chicago, because in 1888, only
four years later, the Bureau of Justice, the first true legal aid society, opened its doors to people
of any nationality or gender.
Smith reasoned that Der Deutsche Rechtsschutz Verein, The Protective Agency for
Women and Children, and the Chicago Bureau were born out of indignation over the lack of
legal protection for the poor, without which placed the power of law “in the hands of their
oppressors.”11 How much power the oppressors possessed or how many seductions or
debaucheries were averted by these new protective agencies is unclear. What is clear is
whether it was a response to the abuses of the legal process by those who could afford
attorneys or the current civil and criminal justice system’s failure to protect the poor, early
societies recognized that justice for the poor could no longer be realized without an attorney.
The German Society, Woman’s Club, and Chicago Ethical Cultural Society were the first to
recognize the need for legal aid.

America’s Changing Landscape
By 1880, New York City, home of Der Rechtsschutz Verein, passed one million residents.
The engine of American industry acted like a magnet to millions of foreign people looking for
opportunity. From 1880 to 1920, US commercial growth garnered what labor it could from the
9

Smith, 135.
Earl Johnson Jr., Justice and Reform: The Formative Years of the OEO Legal Services Program (New York: Russell
Sage Foundation, 1974), 4.
11
Smith, 9.
10
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able-bodied men, women, and children comprising 23 million immigrants. The influx of
newcomers, including the mass migration of rural people to industrial areas, led to urban crises.
By 1920, America reached a turning point when, for the first time, more Americans lived in
cities than in rural areas. This segmented, decentralized America, described by Robert Wiebe
as, “a nation of loosely connected islands,”12 with small-towns as the norm, was disappearing.
Frantic urbanization and industrialization turned many towns into cities and displaced
traditional communities. According to Lawrence Friedman, “the small face-to-face
communities grew larger and became societies of strangers…the demands of economic
rationality and the need for predictability and certainty asserted their claims.”13 More formality
meant more rules. According to Smith, the attorney was critical in navigating the legal system
for justice:
With the great cities came the infinite complexity of modern life, of business, and of
affairs in general which breed litigation. The law itself became highly complicated. With
thirteen thousand decisions of courts of last resort being made each year and twelve
thousand laws annually enacted by the legislatures, no man could determine his rights
without employing attorneys.14

Smith contended that the right to justice based on a government of laws was the
cornerstone of the republic, because the rights of every individual, their life, liberty, property,
and character depended on it. From New York’s Bill of Rights mandating that “Neither justice
nor right should be sold to any person, nor denied,” 15 to the Illinois Constitution, avowing that
“Every person… ought to obtain right and justice freely,”16 legal aid provided requisite attorneys

12

Robert Wiebe, The Search for Order, 1877-1920 (New York: Hill & Wang, 1967), 4.
Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005), 31.
14
Smith, 7.
15
Part I, Declaration of Rights, Article VI.
16
IL, Constitution Article VIII, Section 12.
13
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to safeguard America’s guarantee of a right to justice. Were legal aid societies simply a
response to America’s chaotic transformation? Certainly they developed more from necessity
than from missionary work. The sheer number of laws enacted and court decisions issued are
the justice system’s attempt to fashion law and create order out of America’s changing
landscape. Confusion and complication of law and procedure were the byproducts of the need
to create order. The attorney was now more important than ever; and, with the poor’s growing
inability to afford one, the fight was fixed against them.

Legal Aid Evolves
Smith argued for essential counsel, holding that high demand for help made the old
solution of legal aid undesirable. The days of the kind lawyer taking a case were gone—a relic
of the nineteenth century. Historian Richard Hofstadter noted the change at the turn of the
century as corporations began to monopolize the legal profession, making it increasingly
difficult for the proverbial country lawyer to make a living.17 In 1905, Louis Brandeis declared
that “instead of holding a position of independence, between the wealthy and the people,
prepared to curb the excesses of either, able lawyers have, to a large extent, allowed
themselves to become adjuncts of great corporations and have neglected to use their powers
for the protection of the people.”18 In larger cities, Smith held “charities, churches, bar
associations, women’s clubs and the like found themselves confronted with the pressing
problem of how to obtain justice for poor persons who came to their attention.” 19

17

Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to FDR (New York: Vintage Books, 1955), 156-164.
Louis Brandeis addresses the Harvard Ethical Society at Phillips Brooks House on May, 4, 1905. Louis D.
Brandeis, “The Opportunity in the Law,” The American Law Review 39 (July-August, 1905): 559.
19
Smith, 140.
18
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In response, new legal aid societies, modeled after New York, reproduced in kind to
answer the rising problems associated with urbanization: Boston Legal Aid Society (1900), New
Jersey Legal Aid Association (1901), Legal Aid Society of Philadelphia (1902), Cleveland Legal Aid
Society (1904), and the Legal Aid Dispensary of Denver (1904). In 1905, the Bureau of Justice
and Protective Agency merged to become the Chicago Legal Aid Society. By 1909, all of the
larger cities in the East offered some type of legal aid work. From the East to the Midwest, and
into the Pacific Northwest and Southwest regions, legal aid spread across urban America with
Legal Aid Bureau of Baltimore (1911), Legal Aid Society of Rochester (1911); and similar
organizations in Kansas City in 1910, St. Louis, Akron and St. Paul in 1912, and Duluth,
Minneapolis and Louisville in 1913.20 By 1913, there were twenty-eight legal aid organizations.
The term “legal aid” became synonymous with such organizations, noted Smith, and “the
phrase…came to carry a clear connotation of safety and relief to the minds of the poor.” 21
To be sure this process was but another aspect of American “progressive reform,” which
began in the big cities in the 1880s, slowly spread to the states, and by 1901 to the Federal
Government with Theodore Roosevelt as president. Innovations such as the Legal Aid Review
(1903) and Legal Aid Alliance helped promote interest and financial support and encouraged
the sharing of vital resources among societies.22 Indeed, the Alliance helped form a clearing
house whereby cases were transferred from one city to be handled in another. Further
developments involved the Association of the Bar of the City of Detroit, which established and

20

Smith, 145.
In 1896, Der Deutsche Rechtsschutz Verein changed its name to the New York Legal Aid society. After “Boston
Legal Aid Society” adopted the nomenclature in 1900, the term “legal aid” became the uniform way to describe
such organizations. Smith, 138.
22
The Review provided interesting stories on client cases and notes on the significance and development of legal
aid work.
21
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supported a legal aid office in 1909, making it the first such organization to join the movement.
Kansas City, in particular, took legal aid out of the realm of charity and placed it under a
department of municipal government, the Board of Public Welfare. The city paid for legal aid
expenses through its public treasury. By doing so, the City of Fountains “put the ideal of the
fundamental law into practice and saw that no one was denied justice because of inability to
employ counsel.”23
By 1917 there were forty-one societies including ones in San Francisco, Milwaukee,
Columbus, Nashville, Plainfield, Richmond, and San Diego.24 Four public defender organizations
provided criminal representation, while two offered both civil and criminal. The Los Angeles
Defender’s Office (1914) and its counterparts in St. Louis, Dayton, Dallas (1915), Portland, OR,
and Omaha (1916) took on civil cases. Notable legal aid developments included a studentsupported legal aid society established by George Washington and Yale University law schools,
and the “The Voluntary Defenders Committee” (1917) in New York, which provided legal aid
work in the criminal field.
Legal aid societies responded to the growing need for attorneys. “The most important
fact,” held Smith “is that the prevailing type of organization shifted to that of the publicly
controlled, publicly supported bureau.”25 Public involvement of legal aid, involving both civil
and criminal matters, transformed the movement by challenging the idea that it was a charity—
rather, legal aid was a reputable, proven, and integral part of the administration of justice.

23

Smith, 146.
Ibid., 148.
25
Ibid., 148. According to Smith, “Up to 1910, of the fourteen societies that attained permanence, ten were
organized as private charitable corporations. From 1910 through 1913, of the fourteen societies that lasted, eight
came into being as departments of organized charities”, 145.
24
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The Legal Aid Movement
Smith startled the officials of the American Bar Association (ABA) when he suggested
sending copies of his controversial book to all attorneys. In response, the ABA refused to send
him its membership list. Ultimately, interest from ABA leaders, such as Charles Evans Hughes,
led to an entire session devoted to legal aid at the 43rd Annual Convention of the ABA (1920).
Notable speakers such as Hughes, a past and future Supreme Court Justice, and Judge Ben
Lindsey, a pioneer in the establishment of the Denver juvenile court system, addressed poverty
and the administration of justice. The director of the Philadelphia Welfare Department, Ernest
Tustin, made the case for a legal aid bureau:
To investigate and prevent impositions upon the poor and ignorant and to furnish a
proper and rational defense for men, women and children without means is just as
much an obligation as to fill the office of district attorney for the prosecution of crime or
to provide a city solicitor to enforce health mandates and building restrictions.26

The session ended with the creation of a Special Committee on Legal Aid. By 1923, the
National Association of Legal Aid Organizations (NALAO) succeeded the National Alliance of
Legal Aid Societies. The NALAO later became the National Legal Aid and Defender Association
(NLADA).27 Smith’s call for a national legal aid organization had been answered.
By the 1930s resources for legal aid more than doubled with the addition of thirty new
legal aid organizations, but the decade would be dominated by growing concerns over the
Great Depression. With businesses trimming costs, the legal profession was often the first
service to be cut. As corporate bankruptcies increased and many individuals went broke,
26

Reginald Heber Smith, Charles Evans Huges, Ernest L. Tustin, and Ben B. Lindsey, “Justice and Need of Legal Aid,”
American Bar Association 6, no. 5 (October, 1920): 85.
27
In 1912, an informal group of legal aid organizations met in New York to form the National Alliance of Legal Aid
Societies. Discontinued during WWI, the Alliance resurfaced in 1923 to become the National Association of Legal
Aid Organizations.
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private attorneys and members of the ABA grew concerned over the diminishing number of
clients. Self-preservation took precedence over charitable legal aid. Hard times only resulted in
growing caseloads for legal aid organizations. Unable to keep pace with demand in times of
prosperity, financial support for legal aid decreased as caseloads increased. During the first
three years of the Depression the workload almost doubled from 171,000 new cases in 1929 to
307,000 in 1932.28 Afterward and throughout the decade, cases declined. Underfunded legal
aid societies could no longer meet demand in a timely and reasonable manner; as a result of
these delays, many clients simply gave up.
During the 1940s and 1950s, legal services continued their expansion. In 1949,
approximately fifty-seven percent of large cities housed a legal aid office; by 1959 the number
rose to seventy-nine. The development of new legal aid societies was no easy task: almost all
societies required the support of local bar associations. Emery Brownell, staff leader of the
NLADA explained the difficulty of garnering that support:
Whether due to unfounded fear of competition, inherent lethargy, or mere lack of
interest, the failure of local bar associations to give leadership, and in many cases the
hostility of lawyers to the idea, have been formidable stumbling blocks in the efforts to
establish needed facilities.29

Legal aid leaders found that eloquent speeches on morality and equal access to justice did little
to entice apathetic or hostile state bar associations; rather, documentation, in writing, of the
practical advantages of legal aid won their hearts. Winning arguments held that legal aid filters
out non-paying clients, and keeps them out of private lawyers’ offices. Moreover, by securing
back wages for discharged employees and support funds for abandoned women, legal aid
28
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societies kept people off the relief roles. Legal aid also educated people about the value and
necessity of lawyers, which increased future business for private practitioners. Finally, legal aid
was not only a training ground for young lawyers, but established a better public image of the
bar with the general public.
The largest boost for legal aid in the U.S. came in 1950 from a foreign source when the
British Parliament funded its Legal Aid and Advice Scheme. Great Britain’s government-funded
legal aid system smacked of socialism at a time when the second wave of the Red Scare and
McCarthyism left Americans, once again, concerned about and fearful of communism and
socialist programs. At the time, the average lawyer looked askance at a federal program for
legal aid. “To me, the greatest threat aside from the undermining influence of Communist
infiltration,” said former ABA president Robert G. Storey, “is the propaganda campaign for a
federal subsidy to finance a nationwide plan for legal aid and low-cost legal service…”30 Storey
likened the minority Lawyer’s Guild, which pushed for such a campaign, to the minority
organized by Hitler and Lenin to secure their revolutions. The ABA condemned any government
role in legal aid. Orison Marden, President of the NLADA, saw private legal aid as a protective
measure against socialism and government control of the legal profession. In response, many
states and local bars began to support private legal aid societies. Johnson refers to the fact that
“In an earlier time—the 1930s, for instance—proponents of legal aid might have embraced the
opportunity to obtain government funds. But the rhetoric and experience of the 1950s had
turned leaders of the legal aid movement completely away.”31
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By the 1960s the legal aid movement still could not meet the demand for its services.
Funding was exclusively private with the majority of funds coming from community chests
(60%) and bar associations (15%) and the remainder from campaigns and Pro Bono. “There was
almost no governmental support—federal, state or local—,” said Johnson, “and a philosophical
preference among the members of legal aid societies that things remain the same.”32 The ABA
and NLADA remained reluctant to use federal funding. According to Johnson, even with
comparative prosperity, total funding for legal aid in 1962 was less than $4 million. This
equated to four hundred full-time lawyers serving fifty million Americans or one lawyer per
120,000 persons, resulting in underpaid staff attorneys with unrealistic caseloads.

Right to an Attorney
Until Gideon v. Wainwright guaranteed legal representation in the criminal context, the
scales of justice were unfairly stacked against poor persons charged with a felony crime.33
Beforehand, the right to counsel surfaced in only a few Supreme Court cases. In 1938, in
Johnson v. Zerbst, the US Supreme Court reaffirmed Amendment VI of the US Constitution
which guaranteed the rights of criminal defendants to a speedy trial, impartial jury, notice of
accusation, and “In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right…to have the
assistance of counsel for his defense.”34
As early as 1853, the Indiana Supreme Court, in Webb v. Baird, (6 Ind. 13) recognized a
right to an attorney for criminal defendants. However, the right was based on "the principles of
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a civilized society," rather than constitutional law. According to the NLADA today, “The right to
counsel in federal proceedings was well-established by statute early in the country’s history…
The Webb v. Baird decision however, was the exception rather than the rule in the states.”35 In
1932, in the Scottsboro Case, the Court held that defendants were entitled to an attorney in
State capital cases. In the opinion, Justice George Sutherland strongly supported the need for
an attorney,
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the
right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman…requires the
guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though
he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to
establish his innocence.36
The Court’s view suggested a possible extension of Sixth Amendment rights to states in
the future. However, ten years later in Betts v. Brady (1942) the Court chose not to extend
those rights. Although Justice Owen Roberts and others recognized a need for counsel, Roberts
was “unable to say that the concept of due process incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment
obligates the States…to furnish counsel in every such case,” he argued that, “the states should
not be strait-jacketed in this respect."37
The Warren Court believed that the right to counsel in criminal cases was “so
fundamental and essential to a fair trial, and so, to due process of law, that it is made obligatory
upon the States."38 Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) overruled Betts v. Brady. The decision
emphasized the fact that governments which spent large amounts of money to try defendants
and defendants, who spent large amounts of money to hire the best attorneys, considered the
35
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aid of a lawyer absolutely necessary. In delivering the opinion, Justice Hugo Black asserted,
“The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and essential
to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours.”39
The Gideon decision required that all governments, federal, state and local, provide
public legal counsel in all criminal cases. As a result, states began expanding their role in the
representation of indigent defendants with public defenders. Until 1963, other than the rare
public defenders in the larger cities, the poor relied on either volunteer or Pro Bono attorneys
or no one at all.
Gideon only offered the American poor the right to counsel in felony cases.
Consequently, in civil matters such as unlawful evictions, wage claims, child custody, etc., the
poor relied on underfunded and exclusively private legal aid programs unable to meet demand.
By 1962, only five municipal legal aid bureaus existed, four fewer than in 1919, and seven fewer
than in 1932.40 With less than $4 million in total funding for legal aid programs, legal services
leaders and others began looking for government help. The Kennedy Administration at the
time pushed for increases in social security benefits and other anti-poverty legislation, but it
was not until Johnson’s administration and a desire to eradicate increasingly visible poverty,
that more substantial funding came in the form of the OEO.

Poverty Becomes Visible
According to historian James T. Patterson, “[The] shift of poverty to the North and the
cities was the most significant change in modern American history. By the mid-1960s it helped
make poverty visible again and facilitated community organization and political pressure from
39
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the poor.”41 Continued immigration and business cycles only enlarged the indigent population
in America’s cities. Technological advancements in agriculture, specifically the mechanical
cotton picker in 1943, eventually displaced over 2.3 million family farm workers in the South,
resulting in a net loss of 2.2 million inhabitants in the 1940s and 1.4 million in the 1950s.42
Migration to urban areas resulted in noticeable areas of poverty. Discrimination and racism
exacerbated urban poverty. Civil rights activist Walter White of the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) noted that “between 1935 and 1950, while
approximately 2,761,000 dwelling units were built under the FHA insurance program, no more
that 50,000 of them were available to nonwhites.”43 Discrimination by the FHA on economic
grounds denied loans to blacks and other minorities looking to live in better areas. Restrictive
covenants, redlining, blockbusting, and white flight created predominantly poor black
neighborhoods and perpetuated the spiralling cycle of decreasing property values,
underfunded schools, lack of education, growing unemployment, rising crime, and increased
incarcerations.44 White middle class city residents fled to the suburbs to escape these
problems as well as congestion, increasing numbers of minorities, rising taxes, and other issues.
By 1960 fifty-five percent of America’s poor lived in cities and thirty percent in small towns.
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The extent of poverty had become visible as the rest of the nation enjoyed affluence and a
rising standard of living.
Postwar social scientists knew surprisingly little about poverty. Due to the prosperity of
the 1940s and 1950s, poverty-related research and publication had hardly advanced. The
postwar return to prosperity led many middle class white Americans to forget the Great
Depression and return to the boundless optimism of the 1920s. Now with social security and
other safeguards, the cultural mindset believed a strong economy would pull most of the needy
out of poverty and end the need for welfare. Some optimism was not unfounded, as economic
growth steadily lowered the percentage of those living below or at the government’s poverty
line. Based on economist Herman Miller’s definition of a minimum subsistence or a life of
“decency and health,” poverty “rose from 40 percent in 1929 to 48 percent (61 million people)
in 1935-1936 and then fell steadily to 33 percent (44 million) in 1940, 27 percent (41 million) in
1950, and 21 percent (more than 39 million) in 1960.”45 Average personal income also
increased from $3,343 in 1936 and $5,150 in 1946, to $6,193 in 1960. Still, by the 1950s,
despite increases in personal income and decreases in the percentage of poverty, a multitude
of social problems remained; nearly 40 million people, or one-fifth of the American population
were impoverished, with a growing number of urban poor.46

War on Poverty
“By the early 1960s,” Patterson held, “reformers echoed Herbert Hoover and the
optimists of the 1920s in assuming poverty was un-American and could be abolished.”47 But
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Michael Harrington’s 1962 bestseller, The Other America, claimed otherwise. Harrington found
“new,” hard-core poverty in America, comprised of old people, female-headed households and
minorities. “Tens of millions of Americans are, at this very moment, maimed in body and spirit,
existing at levels beneath those necessary for human decency,” stressed Harrington, “If these
people are not starving, they are hungry, and sometimes fat with hunger, for that is what cheap
foods do. They are without adequate housing and education and medical care.” 48 This
perpetual culture of poverty would not be easily abolished.
Harrington’s book inspired Lyndon B. Johnson, who as president implemented a “War
on Poverty,” following the death of JFK. With 30 years in public life, a network of allies, a liberal
majority in Congress and a visible poverty, Johnson asked the country in 1964 to build a “Great
Society” and join in the “War.” Johnson sought a program that would fulfill every American’s
basic hopes,
his hopes for a fair chance to make good; his hopes for fair play from the law; his hopes
for a full-time job on full-time pay; his hopes for a decent home for his family in a decent
community; his hopes for a good school for his children with good teachers; and his
hopes for security when faced with sickness or unemployment or old age.49

In response, Congress passed the Economic Opportunity Act, which created the Office of
Economic Opportunity (OEO). In turn, the OEO created the Community Action Program (CAP)
to fund local community-based anti-poverty programs also known as Community Action
Agencies (CAA). All types of proposals were eligible for CAP funding, with millions of federal
dollars available. “It was as if the task force, lacking time to draft creative legislation,” Earl
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Johnson said, “hoped that creativity would surge during the implementation stage of the act.”50
CAP offered opportunities for both new programs with new ideas, and much-needed money for
established programs. Under the leadership of Director R. Sargent Shriver, the OEO funded
multiple programs such as Head Start, Job Corps, Domestic Peace Corps and the Legal Services
Program, which, modeled after the Neighborhood Lawyer Programs, offered a new approach to
legal aid designed to fight a war on poverty.
Neighborhood Lawyer Programs

The lessons learned from the early failures and later successes of the neighborhood
lawyer programs helped develop the model for President Johnson’s Legal Services Program
(LSP). Sharing a commitment to reducing poverty, these programs embraced different
philosophies and used various approaches in social reform. According to Earl Johnson, “they
were after something more palpable than procedural due process.”51 For example, under a
Ford Foundation grant, the Community Progress, Inc. (CPI)52, in New Haven, Connecticut,
offered a decentralized approach to social rescue. The plan involved a team of social workers
and lawyers to “diagnose, refer, and coordinate the legal problems of the poor.”53 The New
Haven proposal sought to fix the clients’ psychological, social, and or educational deficiencies
with the goal of helping them become more self-sufficient and partake of the nation’s
affluence. Unfortunately, CPI had little opportunity to succeed. A controversial rape case

50

Earl Johnson, 40.
Ibid., 34.
52
th
William Pincus died on May 15 , 2014. He worked tirelessly to provide legal assistance, first in criminal cases
and later in civil cases. As an employee in the government and law division of the Ford Foundation Pincus made
grants to provide financial support for pioneering efforts and new directions in legal education and for research in
improving the administration of justice.
53
Johnson, 22.
51

19

involving a young black defendant created a negative backlash.54 Seven weeks later, after
pressure from local residents and community leaders, CPI suspended its services. Although
never funded, a second New Haven proposal influenced the model of LSP with its focus on
poverty and the idea that the lawyer and legal activities would be coordinated with a wide
variety of community services.
In a similar decentralized approach, the Mobilization for Youth (MFY),55 in New York’s
lower East Side, offered another approach to law reform. Influenced by social welfare planner
Elizabeth Wickenden, Director Edward Sparer used lawsuits and test cases to challenge the
welfare system. The New York proposal sought to change the rules and practices that divert
funds away from the poor class. MFY almost suffered a similar fate as CPI.56 Due to MFY’s
controversial test cases which included attacks on the Welfare Department, the latter withdrew
its support and pressured representatives of other public agencies on MFY’s board to
investigate the legal unit. The Welfare Commissioner and Deputy Administrator Henry Cohn
complained that lawyers were jeopardizing relationships vital to MFY’s overall purpose. This
behavior, they argued, did not promote the cooperative effort envisioned in the proposal.
Marvin Frankel, Chairman of the Faculty Advisory Committee of MFY’s legal unit, convinced the
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Board that interference by officers or lay members regarding a lawyer’s conduct of a case was
prohibited.57 Moreover, the Canon of Legal Ethics protected the client-lawyer relationship from
such violations. The MFY Committee on Direct Operations agreed. MFY was saved. More
importantly, the board of MFY permanently recognized the independence of the program’s
lawyers.
In May 1964, in a large anti-poverty effort, the United Planning Organization (UPO),
(formed by the Ford Foundation to undertake broad missions) established three neighborhood
service centers in Washington DC. UPO wanted lawyers to demonstrate the synergistic effects
of teamwork.58 Some poor, they believed, only talked to lawyers because talking with social
workers and psychologists implied illness or weakness. In any case, UPO looked to add legal
services to its new Neighborhood Legal Services Program (NLSP). Learning from New Haven
and MFY, NLSP chose a separate board of local lawyers to decentralize and insulate it from
direct controversy. The board established criteria for certain cases and referred others to other
legal services programs. The program provided specialized legal assistance and worked with
other organizations and disciplines. It pursued two major goals: establish unmet legal needs
and therefore justify NLSP’s existence, and “rescue” or lift individuals and families out of
poverty.59
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In July, 1964, Jean and Edgar Cahn published “The War on Poverty: A Civilian
Perspective”. The Cahn Thesis, as it was known, analyzed the strengths and weaknesses of the
neighborhood lawyer programs and suggested a new type of firm with a “Civilian Perspective.”
This thesis proposed the use of Community Action Agencies (CAAs) comprised of local private
and public non-profit organizations. To be more responsive to poor residents’ needs, boards
included some as members, the idea being that, poor persons could better identify the needs of
the poor. At a minimum, the agency would have someone providing a voice from the
impoverished. The “Civilian Perspective” addressed the concerns of the New Haven and New
York programs over lawyers being subordinate to social workers, and clients being subordinate
to lawyers. “The concept,” held Johnson, “would serve as the powerful voice through which a
local poverty community would exert influence over the agencies responsible for distributing
income and opportunity to that community.”60
Thus, the Legal Services Program embodied ideas about, and the lessons learned from,
the neighborhood lawyer experiments. LSP required that representatives of the poor, or lowincome members, sit on the boards of local programs [Cahn Thesis on Citizen Participation].
The programs would work with organizations helping the poor [CPI & NLSP]. Lawyers would
represent clients in all areas of law, excluding criminal defense. And LSP programs would
participate in reforming regulations, statutes, and administrative practices [MFY].
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Connection to Poverty

How did legal services become part of the “War on Poverty”? The connection of legal
services to the OEO began with Jean and Edgar Cahn.61 The Cahn Thesis and Edgar’s speechwriting ability allowed him to work with Shriver’s top aide Adam Yarmolinsky, and ultimately
work as a key assistant to Shriver. When Shriver created a special task force to “assess the
potential role that lawyers might play in the antipoverty effort,”62 the members consisted
largely of the Cahns’ original creative group. The Cahns and others convincingly argued that
legal aid was a vital part of the War on Poverty. The Thesis advised that “Wars require
recruitment, mobilization, internal discipline, a careful assessment of objectives, and a
comprehensive strategy for victory. The War on Poverty is no exception.”63 Lawyers were ideal
combatants for this war. They were well-equipped for all the intricacies of social organization.
By working with lawyers, the poor felt empowered. “There is no self-demeaning implication,”
the Cahns held, “or taint of helplessness and internal confusion in requesting the services of an
attorney.”64 Further argument concluded that due to the nature of the profession, lawyers did
not have to be apologetic about class status. They did not have to be “one of them.” Lawyers
were also in the business of suing for redress of grievances. They had the power to exact a
response from reluctant public officials, welfare institutions, private service agencies, local
businesses and more. Furthermore, the advocacy orientation of the profession allowed the
lawyer to act independently of the pressures of the institution they worked for. Due to the
“case-oriented” nature of legal aid, lawyers could also identify real problems. This was a
61
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positive contradiction to organizations articulating the problems themselves. Last but not least,
the poor needed legal help.
Many of the problems faced by slum dwellers are either legal in nature or have legal
dimensions. Divorce, eviction, welfare frauds, coerced confessions, arrest, police
brutality, narcotics convictions, installment buying—all involve legal problems, at least
by the time a crisis arises. Further, nothing destroys the momentum of a militant
community effort more than alleged technicalities of law or the alleged statutory
inability of an official to redress a grievance.65

In the end, the OEO and the powers that be, agreed that a concerted, comprehensive
attack on the sources of poverty must include legal problems among the economic, educational
and psychological problems of the poor.

The Movement and Poverty
The social reform movement consisting of the Ford Foundation-funded Neighborhood
Lawyer Programs was a separate movement from the legal aid movement involving the
hundreds of legal aid societies. Boards and Directors of legal aid societies felt no fault and
shared little guilt in the existence of poverty, defining legal aid as an ameliorant rather than a
cure. They were not insensitive, but they failed to make a direct connection between denial of
justice and economic inequality. They were also leery of federal money and saw no connection
with its services and the OEO’s goal of eliminating poverty. At first, members of the ABA and
NLADA, (associated with the legal aid movement) were unwilling to endorse the OEO Legal
Services Program (OEO-LSP).
Lewis Powell, President of the ABA, foresaw that Great Society funding for legal aid
would happen. In response, Powell, with help from Chairman William McCalpin and others,
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managed to secure an ABA resolution endorsing the OEO.66 The endorsement seemed
mutually beneficial. The ABA, through influential roles in policymaking, would meet its
responsibility and become a leader in making legal services available to all who needed them,
and the OEO would leverage the ABA’s national “muscle” to help promote its own agenda. One
must remember that, as Earl Johnson noted, at the time “the concept of prepackaged so-called
‘National Emphasis’ program [such as Headstart and Upward bound] was still unknown to the
nascent war on poverty.”67
By 1964 there were two distinct legal assistance movements in the US. The 89-year-old
legal aid movement consisted mostly of established middle-aged lawyers and was financed by
charity at approximately $4 million a year. The ideal driving this movement was equal access to
justice. The other movement, financed by the Ford Foundation and federal funds, was only two
years old. The younger lawyers who spearheaded this movement were more concerned with
social reform. Their efforts in fighting poverty aligned with President Johnson’s 1964 State of
the Union Address that declared: “Our aim is not only to relieve the symptom of poverty, but to
cure it and, above all, to prevent it.” Within 18 months, with the ABA endorsement, the two
movements became one crusade that led to a federal program of legal assistance to the poor,
the OEO-LSP.
As part of the war on poverty, the two movements merged to become the Legal
Services Program under the Community Action Program of the OEO. Thus, OEO-LSP was born
from two separate movements with different missions. The new board of LSP would have to
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prioritize its goals: to provide equal access to justice and due process for low-income
Americans, and seek social change through law reform.

Summary
As noted earlier, the landmark decision of Gideon v. Wainwright guaranteed the right to
counsel, but only under “special circumstances,” cases involving felony charges. Civil and nonfelony criminal matters were not included. Justice Tom Clark, who upheld the Gideon decision,
concurred, “There is no reason to apply that protection in certain cases but not others.” 68 Born
out of indignation, and throughout its progressive proliferation, legal aid from its earliest days
provided the right to counsel for civil matters, but only as a matter of charity. In 1965, the
Great Society uprooted that idea by providing federal funding for legal aid.
The OEO employed a comprehensive approach to combating poverty. Many legal
services reformers saw an opportunity for the creation of a federal program for legal aid within
this comprehensive structure; and by 1965, the Legal Services Program was launched with a
dichotomous mission: to provide equal access to justice and fight in the “War on Poverty.”
American statesman Elihu Root had long declared “it is the proper function of government to
secure justice, in a broad sense that is the chief thing for which government is organized.”69 88
years after Der Deutsche Rechtsschutz Verein, the U.S. government formed the OEO-LSP and
the nation finally took a step toward securing that justice.
Concerned about the federal government’s growth, many Republicans, especially
conservatives have attacked the LSP—seeing the federally-funded program as a form of
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welfare—it was anathema to many voters and politicians. Thus the argument over the LSP was
largely related to the idea of welfare and to the traditional view that legal aid should remain a
private charity institution. LSP’s tumultuous history is filled with conservative and occasionally
liberal opposition, especially when LSP-funded programs engaged in law reform.
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The Legal Services Program
It is one thing to rhapsodize about new, vague approaches at pleasant luncheon meetings. It is another
to make tough choices and alienate powerful people in order to implement your rhetoric.
–Earl Johnson Jr., 1974

Introduction
The Legal Services Program of the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO-LSP) was
designed to provide equal justice for the poor and attack poverty through law reform. The idea
of “law reform” was never fully accepted by the legal aid societies, the American Bar
Association (ABA), the National Legal Aid Defenders Association (NLADA) or local bar
associations across the nation. The deadlines imposed by the federal government to spend
funds forced the OEO-LSP administration to offer grants without fully vetting their recipients.
Thus government funds designed to attack poverty through holistic efforts were primarily used
to fund the early legal aid societies and their primary mission of legal representation. The OEOLSP enjoyed some early success in promoting law reform, but the controversy LSP-funded
programs created, threatened the entire program. Law reform was the last straw for many
conservative members of Congress who believed legal aid was a charity. It was one thing for
the government to provide funds for equal justice for the poor, but quite another to attack the
prevailing system on their behalf. It was particularly controversial when legal aid advocates
questioned government authority or attacked businesses that supported political campaigns.
Consequently, powerful opponents began working toward curtailing law reform and eliminating
the OEO-LSP altogether. The OEO-LSP history foreshadowed the ongoing struggle the future
Legal Services Corporation (LSC) would have by championing LSP's philosophy of reform. Since
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its creation in 1974, LSC has become a product of compromise in Congress and a program of
increasing regulations affecting the poor’s access to justice.
This chapter covers the mission of the OEO-LSP and the funding of legal services
programs across the nation. It describes how the OEO-LSP attempted to promote law reform,
how it found independence, and how law reform ultimately created controversy and powerful
opponents. Finally, the chapter addresses the end of the OEO-LSP and the decline of law
reform—considered by many liberals the greatest weapon in the fight against poverty. After
these events, Legal Services lawyers would never experience a more favorable environment to
“dismantle the inequalities that kept the poor entrenched in poverty.”70

OEO-LSP
On September 24, 1964 E. Clinton Bamberger Jr. became the first Legal Services
Director.71 He soon chose Earl Johnson Jr. as his deputy. Johnson is a key figure in LSP history,
because he later became the director and published his account of the OEO in his book Justice
and Reform. According to Johnson, it was an exciting time. A great legal adventure was to take
place as attention turned to the creation of a network of legal aid offices across the nation.
Now that the OEO, NLADA, ABA and legal aid societies had finally agreed to work together, the
task of translating goals into actual grants at the local level began. Johnson described the
arduous task:
It absorbed scores of ABA officials and staff members and occupied the time of literally
thousands of local bar leaders, community action workers, and poverty representatives
70
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during the months their local communities were forming Legal Services agencies. Each
grant was the culmination of a difficult, often prolonged, political process. If the funds
were given to an existing legal aid society, fundamental structural changes and reforms
had to be negotiated. If not, an entirely new political entity had to be created. In either
case, it took a political feat of some magnitude.72

Along with the demanding task of identifying and creating new agencies, the LSP also
battled with major policy decisions. Should law reform that attacks poverty be a priority, or
should legal services lawyers focus mainly on individual client cases? The board evaluated the
OEO initiatives of social rescue, economic development, community organization and law
reform. In the end, LSP set five goals: provide individual representation to individual clients,
advance community legal education, engage in law reform litigation, engage in legislative
administrative advocacy to change the laws effecting poor people, and engage in community
economic development. LSP chose law reform as one of its goals as part of its effort to end
poverty.
The OEO focused on fighting poverty. But why did the existing legal aid programs, with
their primary focus on access to justice, become OEO recipients? According to Johnson,
Bamberger needed to create 75 local agencies by June 30, 1966, and “the most direct way was
to engender enthusiasm…among the existing 242 legal aid societies... already organized…with
boards, staffs, and clients.”73 The plan to use existing programs worked. By April 1966 the OEO
made 34 grants to Legal Services, totaling over $6 million, and by end of fiscal year added
another 70 grants totaling $11 million. Funding for programs had increased from
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approximately $5 million in 1965 to more than $25 million for legal services.74 Bamberger
easily met his goal with 130 grants to communities for legal aid programs and another 25 to law
schools, bar associations and other groups providing legal support and training. As grants
increased and word of mouth spread, more communities began to look at the benefits of
government funding: LSP readily added $15 million to the budget, funding an additional 145
agencies. Within 18 months (January 1, 1966 to June 30, 1967) the OEO helped fund over 300
Legal Services organizations with an annual budget of $42 million. As Johnson noted, “Every
state except Alabama and North Dakota had at least one Legal Services Agency,” and there
were more than 800 neighborhood law offices in 210 communities, with almost 2000 newly
funded lawyers.75
To fulfill its mission and create cohesiveness among grantees, the OEO also funded
“back-up centers,” which kept local field programs abreast of new developments in regulations
and funding, as well as national changes in such relevant legal topics as welfare, housing and
juvenile law. According to NLADA, OEO funding helped create “a national information
clearinghouse, a national training program, and specialized programs to work in areas [for]
particular client populations such as Native Americans and the elderly.”76
Unfortunately, as it turned out, LSP only had eighteen months to fund its programs. By
1967, due to President Johnson’s growing need to cater to the right wing for Vietnam War
funding and the election of many conservatives to Congress in 1966, the OEO budget was
slashed. Perhaps more unfortunate for LSP was the fact that less than a quarter of the legal aid
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programs it funded actually pursued social change. According to surveys, “only 23 percent of
the Legal Services boards supported the use of agency resources to achieve legal change.”77
Earl Johnson felt LSP paid a price for its urgency—not all grantees were screened or fully vetted
to meet the OEO’s philosophical orientation and antipoverty mission. It seemed likely that LSP
would require law reform—it was politically feasible, had potential to make a large impact, and
was the most relevant priority for legal expertise—but shaping programs into institutions that
promoted social progress by attacking poverty through law reform would have to happen later,
if at all.
The OEO infused much-needed money to expand legal services. In 1965, the year
before any federal funding had begun, the combined total of legal aid societies expended
approximately $5.4 million and staffed roughly 400 full-time lawyers. By June 30, 1968, the
annual operating expenditures of the OEO-LSP exceeded $40 million and staffed over 2000
positions. In 1971, the OEO increased its contribution to over $56 million. The increase in
funds was significant for legal services: LSP-funded programs expanded their staff and widened
their range of services provided. In 1965, counting all legal aid societies, NLADA reported
426,457 applicants needing assistance. By 1971 there were 1,237,725 applicants with an
increased percentage in welfare related cases. With added funds, LSP also expanded the reach
of legal services across the nation. By 1972, there were 2,660 staff attorneys manning over 850
offices in more than 200 communities, with only one of the 50 largest U.S. cities lacking a legal
services program.
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According to Johnson, “the tenfold expansion in the financial investment from 1965 to
1971, and the five-fold enlargement of the lawyer force did not result in a commensurate
increase in the number of clients served.”78 Programs needed a certain amount of funds for
administrative costs and overhead; in addition, programs offered more quality type services
involving law reform. Although the numbers were a large improvement, these added costs
account for the disproportionate numbers, and highlight the fact that programs began to focus
on quality rather than quantity. It became increasingly obvious that law reform was the
touchstone of a quality program.

Promoting Reform
In March 1969 Harvard Law School held a Law and Poverty conference. With over 400
in attendance, including ABA officials and representatives from almost all legal services
agencies across the country, keynote speaker Earl Johnson spoke about the value of law
reform. He declared,
it has become apparent that the estimated $400 million to $600 million necessary to
provide services to every indigent is not going to be available today or in the immediate
future…I believe law reform is vital because it is the means by which we can provide
more for the poor than in any other way with less expenditure of time and money.”79
Rather than handle a multitude of cases with the same problem, law reform saved both time
and money by implementing changes in laws that created the problem to begin with. Thus all
client cases could be positively resolved with one change in the law. Programs engaging in
class actions (representing a group of people), lobbying, research, and reform activities had the
potential to exact change through: repeal or getting rid of laws, making changes to existing
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laws, or creating new laws; as well as challenging the rules and regulations that have similar
effects as laws. The OEO-LSP recognized that law reform was an effective means to enhance
justice for the poor, and shortly after Johnson’s speech, made it a top priority.
The fact that only 23 percent of the boards of legal services considered law reform an
essential goal, made it difficult for LSP to achieve its mission. Many directors hired employees
who aligned with their personal legal aid philosophy, be it liberal or conservative.80 The
conservative South, in particular, largely held to the belief that legal aid was a form of welfare
that only expanded government’s role and thus opposed it. Receiving only a small portion of
LSP funding, the South had the greatest number of poor people, and the fewest legal aid
lawyers, which was a setback for the war on poverty. Moreover, the OEO’s stance on local
initiative only exacerbated the problem. As mentioned, the OEO looked to expedite grant
spending through legal aid societies of which the South had few. Conservative local bars and
the legal profession in general had long resisted charitable funds for legal aid, and without their
support, few Community Action Agencies qualified for grants. In hopes of circumventing the
problem of local conservatism, the OEO funded regional legal services programs. Usually,
somewhere within the entire state, a liberal element existed to promote the action.
Unfortunately, the idea did not surface until fiscal year 1968, and by then funding for new
programs were drying up, thanks to the Vietnam War and an increasingly conservative Congress
and apathetic electorate. Ironically, when the money was available, applications in the South
were not, and when the applications were available, the money was not.
80
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LSP sometimes used the threat of less funding to encourage or coerce programs to
comply with certain recommendations. LSP rewarded compliant agencies with increased
budgets and punished non-compliant agencies with cuts. This seemed to do the trick. Johnson
notes that LSP was extremely reluctant to terminate grants; after all, it was the poor who
suffered when budgets were cut to programs. Poor services were better than no services.
Funding did not, however, guarantee a good agency. Staffing was often the difference
between effective or weak programs. “Of all the decisions made by the director of the board of
a local agency,” Johnson concedes, “none ranks in importance with the selection of the staff
attorneys—the operating personnel who deliver the service to the customer.”81 In short, good
attorneys equaled good programs; still, local programs found it notoriously difficult to recruit
talented attorneys. Johnson argued that agencies “seldom sought out high caliber attorneys.
Moreover, that kind of lawyer frequently would not accept employment with such an agency
even if he were offered a position.”82 How then could the OEO-LSP upgrade the quality of
Legal Services programs? The OEO, LSP, ABA, local bar associations and almost everyone
responsible for CAAS and local legal aid programs opposed the idea of federal recruitment or
federal control over the local hiring process. And, LSP lacked the authority to set hiring criteria.
In response, Earl Johnson and LSP introduced national initiatives such as the Reginald Heber
Smith Fellowship and the use of “backup-up” centers to promote the reform philosophy and
improve overall program quality. With the help of these back-up centers and “Reggie”
recipients, the OEO took an activist stance. In the end, a 40% increase in average salaries and
an activist image associated with the OEO helped entice the participation of top-tier attorneys.
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The “Reggie”
The Reginald Heber Smith program funded law schools to establish one-year
fellowships.83 Nicknamed the “Reggie,” this program helped place the “best and brightest”
students and lawyers into local legal aid programs. A prestigious award, the “Reggie” offered
training in such obscure subjects as housing and welfare law, consumer protection and test
case litigation. “Fellows were exposed not only to academicians but also practicing poverty
lawyers, community organizers and ghetto [sic] residents.”84 In 1967, 50 Fellows were assigned
to 39 separate agencies as University employees.
The idea behind the “Reggie” was to attract the best lawyers and enable them to pursue
the OEO’s goal to end poverty—at least on the legal aid front. The program circumvented the
problems associated with local control. Former Executive Director of Nevada Legal Services and
“Reggie” recipient Wayne Pressel began his career with Georgia Legal Services. According to
Pressel, “the Reggie was a great idea because you could take these little legal aid societies, all
over the place, and instantly give them a law reform component…and sort of step over the little
legal aid society and local County Bar association-governed framework.”85 “Reggie” recipients
did not take on regular caseloads, but instead focused on work with a broad effect and impact
on poverty. The program proved successful. According to Johnson, programs with Fellows
were responsible for more law reform than all the agencies combined. One report found that
80 percent of LSP recipients believed the Reginald Heber Smith Program made a significant
difference in the increase in law reform. Fellows also considered their work to be very
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satisfying, as is evidenced by 85 percent of interns who continued their work in legal services
after their fellowship ended. 800 Fellows, including top-ranked attorneys and editors of law
reviews, joined legal services between 1967 and 1972. In 1968 alone, seven legal services
employees were editors of the Stanford Law Review. In essence, the “Reggie” increased the
effectiveness of the antipoverty strategy by promoting reform and luring high caliber attorneys.
Johnson considered it one of his most important achievements as director of the OEO legal
services programs.86
Back-up Centers

The so-called “back-up” centers played a key role in the process. These centers included
such entities as: national training programs, an information clearinghouse, and casework
specializing in areas of substantive law such as welfare and housing, and other subjects
unavailable in law schools but vitally important for legal aid attorneys. Other programs focused
on specific client populations such as Native Americans and the elderly. According to NLADA,
“this unique national infrastructure of centers engaged in national litigation and legislative and
administrative representation of eligible clients, while providing support, assistance, and
training to local programs.”87 These national agencies also worked on legislative reform.
Outside of local boards, the agencies used test cases to advocate reform and, based on the
prototype of Edward Sparer’s Center for Social Welfare Policy at Columbia, magnified the LSP’s
social impact. In addition, these centers initiated lawsuits and pushed legislative proposals in
communities with agencies adverse to law reform and provided the time and manpower for
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agencies bogged down by caseloads, while also providing specific training and research
materials. In short, they shared their expertise. Backup centers also promoted a sense of unity
among programs. Attorneys felt as if they were part of a national program rather than just
someone from a local agency.88
As a result of the Regional programs, the “Reggie” program, and back-up centers, LSP
elevated the quality of local programs and services which awarded it more of a national
presence. Bamberger and LSP’s success in securing funds for programs across the nation and
establishing quality programs was not only a local fight, but an administrative one, too.
Ultimately, to safeguard its mission the LSP, under the aegis of the OEO, had to fight for
independence and control over its own funding.

Fight for Independence
From 1964 to 1969, three major departments—VISTA, Job Corps and CAP—
administered OEO activities. VISTA, or Volunteers in Service to America, the nation’s “domestic
peace corps,” used 3 to 5 percent of the OEO budget. Job Corps, which offered residential
retraining and employment programs (based on the Civilian Conservation Corps) accounted for
25 percent of the agency’s budget, and CAP, the largest program of all, acquired almost 70
percent of the remaining money. CAP, which funded the community-based programs, was also
responsible for LSP.
As mentioned, Bamberger and LSP successfully recruited existing legal aid programs to
meet and exceed the former’s expenditure deadlines. Not as successful, CAP found it difficult
to find and fund CAAs. Its “local initiative” plan was failing, and local CAP programs or CAA’s
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found it difficult to provide solutions to significantly reduce poverty. Under political pressure to
spend the year’s appropriations, the OEO and Sargent Shriver devised pre-packaged
components that local CAA’s could “buy” such as Headstart and Upward Bound. Pre-packaged
or “National emphasis” programs proved more successful than the “local initiative,” as CAA
applications suddenly increased. By the end of fiscal year 1964, CAP spent 20 percent of its
budget on Headstart.
Increased spending on CAP programs led to a sort of antagonism with LSP over its
expenditures. CAP, which was responsible for the LSP, also managed LSP’s funding. In fact,
from the beginning LSP fought with CAP over money and autonomy. LSP’s fight for
independence was arduous.89 According to Johnson’s account, CAP Director Ted Berry
exacerbated problems by attempting to unilaterally lower the amount of grant money available
to LSP from $20 million to $15 million. It seemed to many observers that CAP was deliberately
thwarting LSP growth. CAP wanted to contain LSP, and LSP wanted independence from CAP
and administrative autonomy. The fight continued until 1969 when Donald Rumsfeld, the first
Republican OEO director, abolished the CAP administration and elevated LSP’s status. While
President Nixon dismantled the OEO, LSP gained temporary independence, reporting directly to
Rumsfeld. Nixon affirmed his decision, declaring that the office “will take on central
responsibility for programs which help provide advocates for the poor in dealing with social
institutions…This goal will be better served by a separate Legal Services Program.”90
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Independence for legal services, with independent boards, was crucial. Early
Neighborhood Lawyer programs such as CPI found out the hard way. Law professor Soia
Mentschikoff argued that representation of an interest or client
may involve warfare with medical services, the educational services, the entire political
structure of the city which is involved, and with every social service agency in the
city…legal services cannot, should not and must not rest on an integration of general
community programs.91
The elimination of the CAP administration defused some of LSP’s internal challenges,
but LSP by its very nature created powerful enemies by the type of work it was designed to
undertake. The legal aid attorneys, in their quest for law reform not only challenged
government at all levels but also large corporations and businesses that contributed to political
campaigns. By attacking the very institutions that funded powerful individuals, they created
powerful opponents. Each successful attack contributed to growing efforts in Congress to
curtail LSP’s so-called “hand-biting” activities.

Opponents of LSP
In our government of laws and not of men, each member of our society is entitled to have his conduct
judged and regulated in accordance with the law; seek any lawful objective through legally permissible
means; and to present for adjudication any lawful claim, issue, or defense.
--Canon 7, ABA Code of Professional Responsibility

LSP programs helped change the legal circumstances of low-income Americans. Thanks
to legal representation, clients improved their lives by securing a range of benefits from income
support, employment, and housing, to better working and living environments. Over time, legal
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aid programs created political enemies in the process.92 This was a real threat. Political
opponents, including members of Congress, wielded influence over members of the
Congressional oversight committees, who in turn held the power to end legal services in
America.93 Political interference exposed the vulnerability of local programs. Such was the
case when California Rural Legal Assistance (CRLA) brought suit against Governor Ronald
Reagan and successfully blocked his attempts to cut welfare programs. In response, Reagan
vetoed a $1.8 million refunding grant to CRLA.
Reagan’s veto was based on a report by Lewis K. Uhler, whom the governor had
appointed director of California’s OEO. Uhler’s report, A Study and Evaluation of California
Rural Legal Assistance, listed 127 allegations of misconduct including inciting riots, the misuse
of OEO funds, and an attorney brazenly walking barefoot into court. Some Democrats
considered Uhler’s appointment and report to be politically motivated, a result of earlier
tension between Reagan and CRLA. In 1967, CRLA successfully blocked his attempts to cut
California’s welfare programs, but Reagan’s veto highlighted the vulnerability of Legal Services
programs to political attacks. A Republican-backed amendment to the Economic Opportunity
Act (42 U.S.C. § 2834) in 1970, awarded governors veto power over state OEO expenditures.
Once vetoed, only the Director of OEO could override the action. In response to Reagan’s veto,
CRLA and supporters launched a campaign to save the program. After an all-out effort by CRLA
and others to overturn the veto, the OEO commission ultimately absolved CRLA of any
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misconduct.94 But an important lesson was learned—publically funded legal services programs
were vulnerable to political interference. According to NLADA, “The CRLA controversy, along
with similar fights in other states, made it increasingly clear that political interference would
continue so long as the program remained within the Executive Branch.”95
Influential opponents, such as Vice President Spiro Agnew and Howard Phillips, also
spoke out against legal services. Agnew grew incensed with legal services after the Camden
Coalition v. Nardi case, in which OEO-funded Camden Regional Legal Services (CRLS) secured a
preliminary injunction against the city of Camden, New Jersey. CRLS proved that the city had
violated federal law by failing to provide low-income replacement housing for displaced tenants
after their apartments were destroyed. According to Jerome Falk, Agnew’s allegations “might
have been lifted bodily from the now infamous Uhler report.”96 Agnew claimed that legal
services officials involved themselves with social issues unrelated to ending poverty such as
women’s rights, anti-war protests, free-speech movements and prisoners. Agnew also accused
these programs of allocating resources for these causes at the expense of the poor. Indeed, he
charged these “ideological vigilantes” with turning away clients with more urgent concerns such
as eviction notices. Agnew asked OEO-LSP director Fred Speaker to investigate. After the
investigation, including an on-site visit, review of court documents, and interviews from both
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sides, Speaker submitted his report exonerating the Camden Legal Services lawyers. In his
report Speaker emphasized that “It is essential to remember we are lawyers in an adversary
system with judges the final authority”97
In 1973, a Baltimore grand jury found evidence of bribery and extortion involving Agnew
while Baltimore County executive, Governor of Maryland and Vice President. Agnew dodged
indictment by pleading no contest to one count of tax evasion.98 Agnew resigned on October
10, 1973, only ten months before Nixon, but not before his spirited crusade intimidated local
legal services program officials and led to Fred Speaker’s resignation.99 “For many,” said Earl
Johnson, “Fred Speaker was seen as a casualty of the vice president’s war against legal services
lawyers and their challenges to government policies detrimental to the clients they served.”100
The following year, the Maryland Court of Appeals disbarred Agnew, characterizing his actions
as “morally obtuse.”
Conservative columnist for Human Events Howard Phillips targeted OEO-LSP. Johnson
credits Phillips with “stirring up” much of the opposition, especially from the far right
community, to the program. In 1971 Phillips became the Assistant Director for Program Review
at the OEO. After Nixon vetoed the bipartisan Mondale-Steiger bill, an attempt to remove Legal
Services from the Executive Branch of government, Phillips proposed a “revenue-sharing”
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program. In an effort to appease the conservative wing of the Republican Party, the Nixon
administration considered the plan, but ultimately dropped it, opting instead to modify the
initial committee bill.101 Two years later, skirting Senate approval, Nixon appointed Phillips as
Acting Director of the OEO.
In 1973, at the beginning of his second term, Nixon announced that the OEO would be
disbanded within a year. LSP’s future suddenly became uncertain. With Phillips’ background
and his polemical stance against OEO-LSP, Nixon knew the Senate would not approve of
Phillips’ far right conservative politics. He appointed him anyway. Phillips adopted a hard-line
approach by immediately abolishing the OEO-LSP Notational Advisory Committee, issuing an
edict ending law reform, and moving legal services programs and some support centers from
annual to 30-day funding.102 From month to month, program officials worried about their
existence. Constrained by concerns over funding, programs stopped accepting new cases.
Ultimately two lawsuits brought an end to Phillips’ attacks on LSP. In a consolidated case,
American Federation of Government Employees v. Howard Phillips, et al. (1973), Judge William
B. Jones found in favor of the OEO employees. The court ruled that Nixon’s failure to include
OEO funding in the 1974 budget did not give Phillips the authority to cut or refuse funding to
grantees. In effect, the court held that Congress, not the executive branch, appropriates funds,
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so the presidential budget request did not take precedence over appropriations.103 In Williams
v. Phillips (1973), District Judge William B. Jones declared Nixon’s appointment of Phillips illegal.
Together, both cases invalidated everything Phillips had done, but not before he fired director
Terry Lezner, director and 1969 “Reggie” fellow Ted Tetzlaff and deputy director Frank Jones;
and not before he installed a group of conservative allies into key positions within the OEO,
which proved disastrous for many grantees.104
Following Reagan’s veto, Agnew’s investigations, Nixon’s determination to dismantle
OEO, and Howard Phillips’ purge, it was clear to many supporters that legal services needed to
be insulated from further attacks. The ABA House of Delegates and the National Legal Aid
Defenders Association both passed resolutions calling for an independent legal services
program.

Evaluation
What did the OEO-LSP accomplish in its short life? “If judged by the ambitions of some
of its more brilliant and optimistic pioneers, such as Edward Sparer,” Johnson argues, “the
lawyers OEO funded had largely failed.”105 Millions lived in poverty in 1974, just as millions did
in 1965. Where was the widespread reform of the welfare system? Where was the
constitutional right to the necessities of life? Johnson maintains that OEO-LSP funded lawyers
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brought justice to millions of poor people. Poverty may not have been ended, but lawyers
helped reduce the poverty income gap and mitigated the degree and consequences of poverty.
As he explained,
Lawyers won victories that put money in the pockets of individual poor people and
occasionally entire classes…they saved clients from losing their apartments or forced
landlords to make repairs…they removed barriers to economic advancement such as
racial discrimination.106

Legal services attorneys won landmark cases such as Shapiro v. Thompson (1969), King v. Smith
(1968), and Goldberg v. Kelly (1970) that not only increased eligibility and rolls for public
assistance, but also helped secure dignity for their clients as well. The Shapiro case involved
nineteen-year-old Vivian Thompson, an expecting mother, who had recently moved from
Massachusetts to find that she did not meet Connecticut’s one-year residency requirement; as
a result, Welfare Commissioner Bernard Shapiro denied her application for aid. Officials argued
that needy citizens moved to this state to obtain better benefits, and without a one-year
residency the State was unequipped to budget properly for welfare expenses. The U.S.
Supreme Court found in favor of Thompson, ruling that by denying aid based on residency
states unfairly restricted welfare recipients of their fundamental right to freedom to travel. 107
The welfare system in the 1960s wielded control over recipients by the threat of
denying benefits. Oftentimes, rules were placed on recipients in an effort to control moral
behavior. In 1967, state, city, and county welfare departments held the power to remove
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children from mothers with “multiple instances of illegitimacy.”108 The Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) program also endorsed the “man in the house” regulation, which
denied benefits to mothers who cohabitated, either inside or outside their homes, with “ablebodied” men, aka “substitute fathers.” Caseworkers dropped by unannounced and rifled
through closets and drawers looking for signs of a man in the house. This action not only denied
the mother of the child privacy and discretion over her personal life, but often split up homes
with unemployed fathers. For example, the State of Alabama denied Mrs. Sylvester Smith and
her four children aid, based on her sexual relations with Mr. Williams. Williams, who visited
Smith on the weekends, was not the father of any of her children and did not support them. In
the case of King v. Smith, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Alabama did not meet its obligation
to furnish aid. Moreover, Alabama’s “substitute father” regulation, which was designed to
discourage illegitimacy and sexual impropriety, had no relation to the need of a child. A
“substitute father” such as Williams was not a parent with a state-imposed duty of support.109
The Court’s decision set a precedent giving AFDC mothers a semblance of dignity to have sexual
relations without fear of losing their welfare benefits.
In 1967 John Kelly, on behalf of welfare recipients in New York, challenged AFDC’s
procedure for notice and termination of benefits, which offered no official notice and did not
allow recipients any opportunity to plead their case before scheduled terminations. In the case
of Goldberg v. Kelly (1970), the U.S. Supreme Court held that welfare benefits are statutory
entitlements; as such, recipients had a right to due process. The decision required hearings for
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welfare recipients to present evidence, question adverse parties, and argue their case with or
without counsel before being removed from the rolls.110
Legal services lawyers also made accessible additional money and benefits for the poor.
Despite county opposition, lawyers in twenty-six states sued to secure federal food aid such as
the Commodity Distribution and Food Stamp programs, to feed hungry welfare claimants. In
1971 Ed Polk from the Dallas Legal Services Foundation and Ronald Pollack from the Center on
Social Welfare Policy at Law in New York, brought action against Nixon’s Secretary of
Agriculture to implement one of the two federal food programs in the state of Texas. In the
case of Jay v. Department of Agriculture (1971), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals required 108
reluctant Texas counties to join the food programs. In time, one county after another relented.
“This campaign alone,” noted Johnson, “yielded a dividend of several hundred million dollars in
food benefits to millions of the poor.”111 Between 1967 and 1971, over 8 million people were
added to the food stamp rolls and the associated budget increased from $296 million to $2.7
billion.112 According to Johnson, “legal services lawsuits sought to force local governments to
enlarge their school lunch programs for low-income children.”113 These lawsuits also prodded
Congress to enact the National School Lunch Program in 1970. Too often in states like Texas
and Alabama, whose economies profited mightily from the cheap labor provided by a large
population of African American and other minority workers as well as poor whites, the ruling
white majority at the state and county levels tried to penny-pinch the poor on food, with the
courts having to intervene. Indeed, poor Americans in all parts of the nation, but especially in
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the South and Southwest, needed welfare advocates to help them periodically to combat
conservative officials in states that routinely exploited cheap labor while skimping on programs
that helped supplement their meager incomes.
The Western Center on Law and Poverty, on behalf of not only John Serrano, the parent
of a Los Angeles Public School student, but all California public-school pupils, brought a class
action suit against the California State Treasurer, Ivy Priest, challenging the Golden State’s
method of funding its public schools. The distribution of funding showed large disparities
between districts. In the wealthiest district, the funding per pupil averaged $2,586, compared
to the poorest district at only $407.114 Adding to the problem, California raised property taxes
in individual districts to meet a minimum level of educational funding for their respective
schools. This meant that property owners in poorer districts could be taxed at higher rates than
those in more affluent districts. In Serrano v. Priest (1971), the Superior Court of Los Angeles
held that California’s public-school funding based on local district taxes from real property and
state aid, which led to inequalities in educational expenditures, violated the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court also found no compelling interest to bind a
pupil’s education to property values. The Serrano decision helped ameliorate the problem of
unequal school funding for students in poor neighborhoods. California thus injected outside
money to help subsidize its impoverished communities.115
Legal aid attorneys continued making important strides by winning cases that enforced
minimum wages and hours for women and children agricultural workers, Rivera v. Division of
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Industrial Welfare (1968), eliminated illegal lending practices, Clermont v. Secured Investment
Corp. (1972), increased consumer protections in contracts, Jefferson Credit Corp v. Marcano
(1969), and prevented price gouging, Jones v. Star Credit (1969). In Sniadach v. Family Finance
Corp (1968) and Fuentes v. Shevin (1972), the US Supreme Court outlawed wage garnishments
and repossessions until debtors received hearings.
Through these actions legal services lawyers helped to reduce the poverty income gap,
the amount of money to raise millions of lower income Americans up to and over the poverty
line. In 1964, when the War on Poverty began, the gap amounted to $15.6 billion; six years
later it narrowed to $10 billion.116 According to a Congressional Budget Office report, during
the 1965-1975 periods, poverty declined by sixty percent.117

Legal services lawyers also opened up more opportunities for minorities. By LSP’s practical
launch in 1965, Brown v. Board of Education was over a decade old. The Civil Rights Act of 1964
had been passed and under Title XII the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
designed to eliminate employment discrimination, was enacted. By September President
Johnson signed Executive Order 11246 requiring government contractors to establish nondiscriminatory practices in hiring. Given the history of race/color and sex-based discrimination
in the U.S., Johnson’s administration pushed affirmative action to promote better job
opportunities for minority groups and women. “In many respects, equal opportunity was a joke for

millions of those living in the United States,” declared Earl Johnson, “as were their chances of
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getting a decent job and scaling the economic ladder.”118 Nevertheless, lawsuits were integral
in supporting affirmative action by suing for enforcement of civil rights and eliminating job
discrimination barriers. In one case, Herbert Nowlin from the Legal Aid Association of Ventura
County and Joel Edelman from the Western Center on Law and Poverty on behalf of Latino and
black elementary school students successfully brought a class action suit against the Oxnard
School District’s policy of racial segregation, Soria v. Oxnard School District, (1974). The court
ordered California school boards to correct the racial imbalance. When intelligent Spanishspeaking students were placed in remedial courses, lawyers challenged English IQ placement
tests in local schools. Even before Diana v. California State Board of Education (1970) made it
to court, the State Board of Education responded by implementing a system that allowed
students to take the test in a language of their choice. California Rural Legal Assistance
successfully struck down English literacy tests used in voting; in doing so, thousands of Spanish
speaking citizens gained suffrage, Castro v. State of California, (1970). Then in 1972, a San Diego
Federal Court judge ordered Imperial Irrigation to implement affirmative action, NAACP, et al.
v. Imperial Irrigation District, (1972).
From 1959 to 1971, legal assistance for America’s poor increased ten-fold. LSP helped
finance 250 local legal services programs employing more than 2,600 attorneys and instituted
an “impact work” philosophy that transcended the routine processing of individual client
claims. LSP recorded a 17 percent litigation record. “During its nine-year tenure, 1965 through
1974” says Lawrence, “LSP attorneys brought 164 cases to the Supreme Court on behalf of the
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poor, 119 of which were accepted for review.”119 Lawrence’s study of LSP’s Supreme Court
cases reveals that 74 percent of cases involved challenges to state or local laws where state or
local governments were the opposing party. “In 84 percent of cases, in which the LSP was the
respondent, state governments were challenging the Program’s lower court victories.”120 By
having an LSP attorney to file an appeal in lower courts, opposing parties gained better access
to the U.S. Supreme Court. Before LSP, only one appellate case, Heydenreich v. Lyons,
challenged residency requirements. “By the time Shapiro got to the Supreme Court,” reports
Lawrence, “cases challenging residency requirements had been filed in 15 or 20
jurisdictions.”121 In the end, LSP won 62 per cent of its Supreme Court cases.
According to Johnson, these victories were only part of the story. For every Supreme
Court case there were scores of lesser appellate cases. And for every federal or state appellate
court case there were hundreds of cases in trial courts. OEO-funded legal service lawyers won
approximately 60 percent of their lesser appellate cases and over 70 percent of their trial cases.
In addition to success in the courts, these lawyers “persuaded local governments and
administrative agencies to adopt policies favorable to the poor, educating poor people about
their legal rights and responsibilities, and even teaching them how to represent themselves.”122
NLADA statics show that in 1971 approximately 2,500 lawyers served 1.2 million clients
annually. 123 A majority of casework involved family law (36.6 percent) followed by economic
(15.9 percent) and housing (14.4 percent) issues, with 11.2 percent of cases dealing with
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welfare and social security.124 Based on these numbers, during its seven-year existence LSP
served over seven million clients in matters not unlike the early charitably-funded legal aid
programs. In addition to the seven million, a million to three million clients benefitted from
reform via class actions and court victories.
If viewed as an interest group seeking widespread welfare reform, LSP fell short of
success. However, if one measures quality by defense of a client, legal services did well. OEOfunded legal services programs litigated 11 percent more of their cases than programs prior to
OEO.125 Evidence of the result is in the drop from 54 percent to 42 percent of legal aid clients
receiving only advice. There had not been a single case that made it to the U.S. Supreme Court
during the 89-year history of the legal aid movement from 1876 to 1965. In contrast, from
1967 to 1972, 217 cases involving the rights of the poor were decided, with 73 wins. Of course,
in the 1960s and ‘70s America was more sympathetic to the plight of the poor, a condition that
LSP lawyers fully exploited. Lawrence reasoned that “If LSP is viewed as a mechanism by which
a new class of litigants was able to place its civil claims before the Supreme Court and influence
the policy decisions emanating from that institution, LSP can be characterized as a success.” 126
According to a report by a consulting firm in 1971, “Both the quantity and quality of the
individual services rendered by Legal Services projects far exceeded that generally offered by
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their predecessors…and in most instances at least equals that provided by private attorneys to
paying clients.”127
It is difficult to measure the full impact the OEO-LSP funded lawyers had. Cases such as
Shapiro v. Thompson, King v. Smith, Goldberg v. Kelly, Jay v. Department of Agriculture, Serrano
v. Priest, and others like Castro v. State of California, and Rivera v. Division of Industrial Welfare
greatly improved the daily lives of millions of poor people. With the creation of LSP, the nation
made a commitment to providing the impoverished with access to civil courts. With the formal
adoption of law reform as a program priority in 1969, LSP, in its brief history, provided counsel
and spurred appellate challenges. When met with problems related to reluctant or resourcelimited programs unfocused on law reform, LSP worked to provide solutions such as “Reggies,”
back-up centers and clearinghouses. LSP faced a challenge in seeking reform in a hostile
environment full of obstacles that included opposition from grantees themselves, since not all
legal services attorneys supported reform. In fact, according to Susan E. Lawrence, “broader
support for the Program rested on normative beliefs of equal access to justice.” 128
Nevertheless, according to Lawrence, “LSP reduced the poor’s de facto exclusion from the
judicial process which culminates in the U.S. Supreme Court.”129
The OEO-LSP tasked itself with overcoming the inherited deficiencies of early legal aid
societies such as underfunding, unrealistic caseloads, untrained attorneys and the questionable
professional independence of volunteers. But even with ten times the money, five times the
staff, and triple the caseload, it still fell short of serving all the poor. A study by Gresham Sykes
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in 1969, revealed that 6 to 10 million poor a year needed help, far more than the million being
served.130 The financial truth is that even with dramatic improvement in talent and greater
program impact, legal services attorneys could not handle 38 million people. Without
additional funds, one lawyer would have had to represent 15,000 people annually, an
impossible task. What lawyers did accomplish, however, was an incredible amount of legal
reform and social welfare in a relatively short time. Lawyers were harassed, threatened, and
even terminated for their success. In the end and in the name of the poor, they created
enemies bent on ridding the government of OEO-LSP. “I was proud of the young lawyers who
turned down fat, corporate practices to work for the poor,” Sargent Shriver declared, “and
proudest of them when they dared to challenge state and federal procedures and win.”131 The
Office of Economic Opportunity was abolished in 1981 in the early days of President Reagan’s
presidential administration.

The End of LSP
According to NLADA, “The CRLA controversy, along with similar fights in other states,
made it increasingly clear that political interference would continue so long as the program
remained within the Executive Branch.”132 Recognizing a short life-span and possible future
demise of the OEO, the ABA, NLADA and others such as the Cahns began looking for a new
home for LSP as early as 1970. But where could LSP go?
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In 1969 President Nixon and his new administration created a six-member Advisory
Council on Executive Organization, nicknamed the “Ash Council,” which worked to reorganize a
number of organizations, including OEO. By 1973, Nixon’s administration dismantled and
transferred all but three OEO programs: legal services, economic development and community
action. Transfer of these programs required an act of Congress.
According to Johnson, “Legal services supporters, and presumably the Nixon
administration itself, wanted to divorce the program and its lawyers from the executive branch
of government.”133 ABA committee lawyers such as William Klaus and John Douglas
recommended an independent organization resembling the Public Broadcasting System (PBS),
called the Legal Services Corporation.134 The NLADA recommended that the Justice
Department house legal services. Edgar and Jean Cahn suggested first the federal judiciary, and
then an independent entity. In the end, the Ash Council approved the Cahns’ second choice, an
independent entity. The council’s choice for an independent, non-profit corporation also
placed Nixon and the ABA in agreement.
In 1974, the administration’s budget contained no funds for OEO. The three programs
that remained received $185 million for community action, $71.5 million for legal services, and
$39.3 million for economic development.135 In 1974, with the Economic Opportunity
amendments, Congress disbanded, but did not completely abolish, the OEO and created the
Community Services Administration (CSA) to handle the remaining programs. Most OEO
programs and their employees moved to existing old-line agencies.
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On May 11, 1974, after two attempts at earlier legislation including a presidential veto
of the Mondale-Steiger bill in 1971 and a conference committee withdrawal in 1972, Nixon
proposed a second Legal Services bill. Ominously, the Senate Select Committee began its
Watergate hearings six days later. On July 27, 1974, Nixon signed the LSC Act creating the Legal
Services Corporation (LSC). On the historic evening of August 8, Nixon told Americans in a
national television address, “I shall resign the presidency effective noon tomorrow.”136 LSC was
the last act he signed as President.

End of Reform
Opponents of LSP had gained some ground in the political battle over federal funds.
LSC’s pyrrhic victory toward independence came at a cost to the poor. Legal services
eliminated the controversial initiatives of the OEO from the statute.137 Thus began LSC’s
departure from the “War on Poverty,” and the waning of a comprehensive approach to ending
poverty. Earl Johnson noted that “It was the last time lawyers representing the poor would
have such a favorable climate for leveling the legal landscape through the courts and in the
country’s legislatures.”138 The U.S. Supreme Court majority that favored such a liberal climate
changed. Johnson contends that appeals won in the late 1960s through the mid-1970s would
have been lost in the 1980s; in addition, legislative advocacy in the 1960s was more popular at
the time thanks to the liberal Congress. With the transfer of LSP to LSC, the lawyer’s mission
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changed. Programs were no longer evaluated on their effectiveness in reducing poverty.
Rather, it became a numbers game as the “access to justice” phase of legal services began.
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The Legal Services Corporation
The deal was we would tone it down, make it something beholden to the paternalism of the American
Bar Association. And that's how we got the Legal Services Corporation.
—Wayne Pressel, 2014

Introduction
Although the Legal Services Corporation (LSC) greatly increased the amount of funds
available to Legal Services programs, its new campaign "Access to Justice" marked a movement
away from quality legal services. LSC rescued Legal Services from the dying Office of Economic
Opportunity (OEO), but it came at a price for the poor as the controversial initiatives of the OEO
Legal Services Program (LSP) were eliminated. LSC’s criteria for funding were so strict that
some legal services programs were split or “spun-off” of LSC-funded programs to continue less
restricted work. In the 1970s and afterward actions by the Republican-dominated Congresses,
(gaining complete control of Congress in 1994) and other conservatives have increased
restrictions on LSC funds to the point where Legal Services programs began turning into a
Private Attorney General for State governments—upholding the law rather than challenging it.
The result has been diminished capacity in providing access to justice for the poor. LSC and the
American Bar Association (ABA) initiatives such as Private Attorney Involvement (PAI),
alternative delivery methods such as Pro Se, and the push for non-LSC funds promoting a return
to the private charitable days of legal aid societies, were all favourable events for those
believing legal aid is a form of welfare. An increased reliance on private funds and Pro Bono is
a concern for many who believe that more government assistance is required to fill the
widening gap between justice and the poor. LSC restrictions create a costly and inefficient
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overlap of legal services, making it difficult to coordinate the patchwork of legal services
entities providing our make-shift civil Gideon today.139
This chapter outlines the political problems associated with LSC. It discusses the
"minimum access" strategy, and the issues related to a poverty line. The chapter also covers
LSC’s susceptibility to politics, the increasing restrictions on using LSC funds, and LSC's push for
alternatives such as private attorney involvement and the use of non-LSC funds. Next it
discusses the "Republican Revolution" of the 1980s, which resulted in the greatest restrictions
on funding and ultimately ended the controversial "Support Centers" and the "Reggie"
program. It also describes the changes LSC-funded programs were forced to make. Finally, the
chapter will offer an analysis of "diminished capacity" for lawyers and whether civil legal
representation will become a matter of right.

Legal Services Corporation
LSC was supposed to deliver LSP from U.S. government control, but it came with
historical controversies and ongoing debates over the mission of federally-funded legal services
and the looming threat of defunding.140 Ideally, the program would be kept free from political
pressure, and attorneys would have full freedom “to protect the best interests of their
clients,”141 but LSC was only quasi-independent. Congress failed to heed the lessons learned by
the early neighborhood lawyer programs; as a result LSC did not have a truly independent

139

A “civil Gideon” refers to a civil equivalent to the 1963 U.S. Supreme Court Case Gideon v. Wainwright, wherein
the Court decided that criminal representation for the poor was mandatory.
140
The debate over LSC’s mission has largely focused on the anti-poverty activities adopted from the Legal Services
Program of the Office of Economic Opportunity. The debate is over whether or not legal services should focus on
class actions and legislative and administrative advocacy to combat poverty, or return to the earlier days of the
legal aid movement that dealt strictly with individual problems on a case by-case basis.
141
Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974, 42 USC 2996, Section 1001. In protecting their clients, lawyers had to
keep with Code of Professional Responsibility and the Canon of Ethics.

60

board. Congressional control over budgets and presidential appointments of the board left the
federally-funded program, however insulated, vulnerable to political attacks; and, in keeping
with the Code of Professional Responsibility, lawyers would no longer represent controversial
clients, as that population of the poor was simply restricted from accessing legal services
beforehand.

Access to Justice
According to Jon Sasser, the ABA, as a champion of Legal Services, recycled the term
“Access to Justice” as part of a political strategy. The idea of access to justice for the entire
nation meant expanding vending for legal services—deciding how many lawyers were needed
for a city or county’s poverty population of poor residents. “Now the ABA could say,” noted
Sasser, “we’ve got vast areas of the country that have very little to no legal services
coverage.”142 Thus, by assuming a generic and amorphous goal for the entire nation, LSC could
go to Congress each year and report, “we still don’t have equal access to justice.”
The OEO-LSP used incentive-based funding to help ensure quality programs. But under
the LSC Act, which recognized a need to provide equal access to the system of justice, LSC could
no longer justify denying funds to all poor people in the name of quality; especially those living
in areas without representation. Thus, shortly after LSC finally took responsibility of legal
services from the Community Service Administration in October 1976, the board adopted a
“minimum access” plan. The “minimum” plan targeted two lawyers per 10,000 poor people.143
According to Earl Johnson, “The ‘law reform’ banner had done its job and run its course, as had
142
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the War on Poverty. It was time to abandon that tattered banner and raise a new and different
one—Access to Justice.”144
Minimum Access

In 1976, Congress appropriated $88 million plus a $4.5 million supplement for LSC, just
shy of LSC’s request for $96 million. This was $21.5 million more than LSP received.145 For fiscal
year (FY) 1977 Congress appropriated $125 million for LSC. Between 1976 and 1981, with
increased funding and support, LSC significantly expanded legal services to cover every county
in the nation. According to legal aid consultant, John Arango,
Every year the corporation would prepare a map showing all the counties in the United
States, and which counties were covered by a legal services program. This proved to be
a very effective tool for congress, because they would look at the counties that were in
their congressional district and see that the counties weren’t colored in, and so they
would make an effort to get a legal services program.146
By 1981, LSC achieved its “minimum access” goal.
The increase in available funds stirred controversy over the “minimum access” strategy.
The primary concern was quantity versus quality. “It was certainly a shift away from the OEO
principles, we would make legal services a national movement, but they were going to have a
legal aid lawyer in every chicken pot,” argued former Nevada Legal Services Executive Director
Wayne Pressel, “so you wound up with this huge expansion of legal services in rural areas,
western places…but in that expansion a whole lot was lost.”147 For Pressel, LSC was simply
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providing a nationwide blanket of untrained legal aid lawyers. Legal Services’ focus now fell on
the means rather than the ends, providing “access” rather than abolishing “poverty.”
According to Sasser, “Access to Justice” had advantages and weaknesses. It helped the
poorly underfunded programs in the West, which was good. “It was bad,” conceded Sasser, “in
that funding did not go to the existing established programs doing all the great work...taking
cases to the U.S. Supreme Court like Goldberg v. Kelly.”148 In short, all the new money went to
programs in the West that lacked the quality and experience of programs in the East. “Also,
those out West didn't have the five goals of the Act to sort of push them,” said Sasser, “Those
of us that were old-timers always believed that we took the five goals out of the statute for
political reasons, but they were still what legal services programs were all about—what they
were supposed to do.”149
Poverty Line
The controversial minimum access strategy, which helped determine the number of
attorneys needed per poverty population, spurred concern over the nation’s calculated poverty
line. The Social Security Administration (SSA) established a poverty threshold in 1959, but with
the national expansion of legal services and increased funding into new areas, the poverty line
issue gained traction.150 Since the war on poverty began Earl Johnson observed, “We have
become accustomed to defining the poor by recourse to a fixed income standard, a so-called
poverty line.”151 Beginning with OEO-LSP, LSC continued using poverty guidelines to determine
client eligibility for legal services. Those living within 125 percent of the poverty line were
148
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eligible for services. In 1965, the SSA poverty guidelines for a family of four were $3,130; in
other words, a family of four making less than or equal to $3,130 a year qualified for services.
By the time LSC assumed its role in 1975, the poverty line for a family of four increased to
$5,050.152
Another concern over the “access” strategy was the distribution of money based on
poverty populations in accordance with a set national poverty line. The strategy did not
account for changing costs of living. According to the early model, $7 for one person or an
annual income set at 125 percent of the national poverty represented more purchasing power
in one area of the country than another. Cost of living varied depending on whether one lived
in the North, South or another region or sub-region, and whether they lived in an urban or rural
setting. The Institute for Research on Poverty identified the cost of living problem along with
other problems associated with a poverty line.153 “It does not reflect modern expenses and
resources, excluding significant draws on income such as taxes, work expenses, and out-ofpocket medical expenses.”154 The unequal weight and arbitrary line of poverty widened the
gap between qualifying for legal services and the affordability of a private attorney. LSC drew
the line at X amount. If a family of four earned $5,051 in 1975, one dollar over the guideline,
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did that suddenly mean it could afford the costs associated with a private lawyer? According to
AnnaMarie Johnson, Executive Director of Nevada Legal Services, “They have never put in
leeway for a person that just makes a dollar over that amount. These days,” Johnson explained,
“most people can’t afford a lawyer, even those that are deemed middle class.” 155
Another issue with the poverty line is that it is an approximation, an estimate designed
to identify the amount of income required to maintain a minimal standard of living for shelter,
food and clothing, etc. Thus, poverty would be eliminated if everyone were elevated above an
arbitrary line. However, poverty could also be based on a nation’s affluence—a percentage of
the nation’s total goods and services.156 In other words, the degree of poverty is relative to the
surrounding wealth of the community. Whether one fell barely above the line, regardless of
the depth of economic need, cost of living or out-of-pocket expenses, or did not qualify for
reasons such as being an unmarried partner, they were not entitled to legal services. Based on
one’s definition of poverty, most low to middle class American families were denied access to
justice.

Minimum Access Continues
By the start of Jimmy Carter’s presidency in 1977 the number of legal services programs
had increased from 258 in 1975 to 320. From 1977 to 1981, the Carter administration
supported the “minimum access” strategy, while promoting national support centers. Notably,
a favorable 1977 amendment to the LSC Act lifted the ban on representing juveniles. The
Carter Administration and his LSC appointments worked to relax restrictions on grants to back155
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up centers and the prohibition against legal aid lawyers organizing groups. Clients of Legal
Services were also appointed to local boards.
Had the larger social questions affecting clients subsided? Research tracing 102 lawyers
who left a major legal services program in Chicago between 1965 and 1974 found that 40
percent continued on with some type of legal activism. They moved to other legal services
programs, created “impact” private law practices, taught legal clinics, joined public interest law
firms, or worked in government jobs enforcing civil rights.157 It seems the original draw of law
reform was not easily diminished. Nevertheless, the external pressure created by outside
organizations such as local Community Action Agencies to address issues of poverty had
diminished. As one LSC staff member complained, “Many legal services programs no longer
address the underlying political questions that affect their clients.”158
In 1978 the Carter Administration appointed prominent attorney and Arkansas
Democrat Hillary Rodham Clinton as chair of the board of LSC. “We believed it important not to
spread the program so thinly while we were trying to provide access,” she noted, “However, if
we were to hold up expansion until…quality was in place and the backup systems were
available, then that didn’t make sense either.”159 Under Carter’s administration, Clinton
successfully lobbied Congress for LSC increases, which rose to $205 million in 1978, $270 million
in 1979 and $300 million in 1980.160 In 1981 the LSC budget hit a high watermark of $321
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million. (During President Obama’s first year, LSC received $440 million, which is equivalent to
an inflation-adjusted amount of $178 million). By 1981, LSC supported 325 grantees with 1,450
offices including 6,200 lawyers and 3,000 paralegals. Legal services covered all 50 states, plus
the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.
Expansion of legal services proved difficult. According to Clinton, “There was
opposition, including speeches on the floor of the House and resolutions in local bar
associations.”161 It was especially difficult in the South. Earl Johnson praised Dan Bradley,
Bucky Askew and Clint Lyons among others for their work in the South. Bradley became
President of LSC in 1979, and helped thwart the Reagan Administration’s attack on the program
in the 1980s. Later, he became a leading advocate of gay rights. Askew, the OEO-LSP deputy
regional director in 1970, was appointed to LSC’s Board of Directors by Bill Clinton in 1994.
Lyons served as acting LSC President, and then headed the NLADA. Interestingly, both Bradley
and Lyons were “Reggies.” Their combined efforts led to 13 new legal services grantees, the
first of 30 grantees in the South. Grantees included Legal Services of Alabama, Georgia Legal
Services, and Rural Legal Services of Tennessee, as well as statewide support centers in all 10
Southeast Region states.

Under Attack
According to Wayne Pressel, Legal Services gradually became beholden to the American
Bar Association. “Almost every ABA president had legal services as his or her first priority
agenda item for years,” said Pressel, “we were protected by the ABA, but we were becoming
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the parent-children.”162 According to Nevada Supreme Court Justice Michael Douglas, the ABA
“is a national organization with clout because they donate to political campaigns, individually
and sometimes collectively.”163 As the governing body of the legal profession, the ABA
composed of trial lawyers, consumer lawyers, bankruptcy lawyers and others grudgingly
supported legal services. Pressel described fights with the ABA, which generally resisted his
“old-time” legal services approach. “By old time,” said Pressel, “I mean now OEO Legal Services
types that would be embarrassments to the ABA.”164 He expanded on the problem of being the
ABA’s protected child,
There was nothing institutional about legal services before the Legal Services
Corporation; and by institutionalized I mean more concerned with its own existence
than the purpose from which it was formed. That's my hallmark of an institution or
bureaucracy…more concerned about its own self-perpetuation than the purpose. LSC
was no longer willing to risk its life for its mission. And that was a subtle set of changes,
and it was always attacked by the right, and as our defense became less and less radical
and became more of an ABA defense, we wound up giving up ground, to giving up
ground, to giving up ground. And so at first there were restrictions on what we could do
in lobbying but it was fairly minor, and then it became more major.165

Thus LSC began providing “minimum access” across the nation in 1977 with minor
restrictions prohibiting “representation involving non-therapeutic abortions, school
desegregation, the military draft and some juvenile cases.”166
LSC survived with the ABA’s “Access to Justice” strategy, but the lack of an independent
board left it vulnerable to attacks. By adopting the ABA defense, LSC attenuated its
effectiveness in representing clients. With constant Congressional threats and major funding
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cuts in 1982, 1996 and 2012, LSC continued to compromise to survive. Thus access to justice
began to constrict and narrow. As a result, 1981 was the first and last year the LSC met its
“minimum access” goal.
The Reagan Years

If Legal Services lawyers considered the Nixon administration unsympathetic to legal
services, the Reagan administration was openly hostile. The Republicans of Nixon’s years were
different from those of Reagan’s. “Legal assistance for the poor, when properly provided, is
one of the most constructive ways to help them to help themselves,” said Nixon. He added,
“Justice is served far better and differences are settled more rationally within the system than
on the streets.”167 Nixon had at least signed the LSC Act. Reagan wanted to eliminate LSC
altogether. In fact, he chose not to reauthorize the corporation, and his budget request did not
include any money for LSC. Ultimately, Reagan was unable to sever LSC’s financial lifeline and
his “zero funding” plan failed.168 Other than packing the board with antagonists, LSC was
insulated from the Executive Branch; and failure of reauthorization did not deny Congress the
right to appropriate funds. LSC survived in 1982, but suffered from a 25% cut in funding.
Congress decreased funding from $321 million to $241 million for the fiscal year. Many Legal
Services offices closed or reduced staff, resulting in a major reduction in services. According to
the NLADA, in 1980 there were 1,406 local field program offices, employing 6,559 attorneys and
2,901 paralegals. In 1982 only 1,121 offices remained; and by 1983, employed only 4,766
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attorneys and 1,949 paralegals.”169 The loss of legal services occurred at the worst time. The
energy crisis of 1979 and ensuing US recession resulted in reduced federal welfare support.170
By mid-1981 the US unemployment rate reached double digits. High unemployment and
reduced government support led to an increased poverty population and demand for legal
services.
Unable to abolish LSC directly, Reagan packed the board with fiscally conservative allies.
By December 30, 1981 they held a majority, and began a string of attacks. The first attack came
in the form of a grant “freeze.” Convening on New Year’s Eve, the board voted to hold all
grants for 1982. The “freeze” came too late. Foreseeing an attack, President Dan Bradley preapproved the grants in November, just before his term ended. Missing that opportunity, the
Reagan board voted to refund all field programs, with the exception that funding for support
centers last only a few months. Congress rejected the board’s actions. Intent on sustaining
funding for LSC programs, a Democratic-controlled Congress implemented a set of “riders”
which ensured funding for grantees and support centers for 1983 at FY1982 levels.171
In 1983, the conservative board used a different tactic. LSC President Donald P. Bogard
created two new headquarter offices: Compliance and Review and Program Development. The
Office of Compliance and Review (OCR) assumed responsibility for monitoring field programs.
The new program’s goal was to identify violations of rules and regulations. Based on violations,
the OCR had the power to sanction programs and terminate their grants. To fully investigate
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any violations, the OCR required more information. Bogard and the board began scrutinizing
the activities of grantees by increasing the complexity of the grantee refunding forms and
requiring that grantees produce detailed answers to new questionnaires.172These new forms
and questionnaires, amounting to volumes of documentation, were given to Senators Orrin
Hatch (R-UT) and Jeremiah Denton (R-AL). Armed with new information, Hatch, Denton, and
the General Accounting Office (GAO) set out to uncover illegal activities within legal services
programs. Bogard proceeded to raid the programs. According to John Arango,
[There was] very intensive and hostile monitoring. Big teams would come out with
former FBI agents to monitor the programs, they'd stay for a week, they were very
difficult people to deal with; they frequently invented regulations on the spot. It was a
very hard time for program boards and staff, particularly those that were committed to
providing high quality aggressive representation.173
Programs in violation could be defunded within 90 days, (Senators Orrin Hatch of Utah and
Jeremiah Denton of Alabama were responsible for streamlining the defunding process).
Hatch and Denton presented their findings in a booklet, Robber Barons of the Poor?
They claimed to find secret lobbying slush funds, an illegal grass roots political apparatus, and
proof that funds were being diverted from the poor to promote radical social agendas.
“Politicians dwell on the promise of the programs, not their performance;” warned Hatch, “the
Legal Services Corporation was an unknown entity…there was no uniform record keeping…no
systematic records of the number of clients served, the types of cases handled, or the cost of
litigation.”174 Following up at the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee, the GAO
reported, “we didn’t have authority to settle the accounts of the Corporation, and it is possible
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for the Corporation to willfully violate the law…there is not significant enforcement
authority.”175 Hatch then asked Congress to amend the LSC Act to include criminal and civil
procedures against any program engaging in prohibited activities.176
In 1984, the conservative LSC added more restrictions and greater scrutiny on
eligibility.177 LSC required programs to report large expenditures and to begin including local
private bars when setting program priorities. LSC also prohibited grantees from lobbying on
their behalf.178 According to Earl Johnson, “LSC staff…sought to close down some of the
programs that supported a broader vision of access to justice.”179 That same year, LSC’s
discovery of a discrepancy in funds controlled by the “Reggie” program administrator led to full
investigations. These investigations, bordering on attacks, forced Howard University to rid itself
of the program. After a 14-year run that enlisted the service of more than 2,300 high-quality
lawyers, the Reggie program came to an end.
Bogard and LSC staff also attacked the controversial Western Center of Law and Poverty
(WCLP), a program that vowed to provide “legal representation before every institution that
shapes their [clients] lives.”180 Five years earlier, Senator Hatch asked the GAO to investigate
the Center over violations of legislative activities. No wrongdoing was found. In 1984, Bogard
made a similar claim that the Center was violating LSC restrictions. After looking into the
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matter Judge Ralph Drummond, a neutral Administrative Judge, disagreed, ruling that the
Center only gathered information and had not violated any restrictions. Bogard denied funding
anyway. Congress was forced once again to add “affirmative riders” for FY1985, this time to
guarantee funding for the WCLP. Shortening the leash, a perturbed Congress also required LSC
to notify the House and Senate before proposing any new regulations.
Reagan won his second election in a landslide. On the eve of Reagan’s second
administration, Don Bogard resigned. LSC had survived a conservative LSC president, and “for a
fifth year in a row,” said Johnson, “LSC would limp into 1985 with a board of ‘recess
appointees.’”181 (“Affirmative riders” restricted the full power of “recess appointees.” Thus the
board’s power was limited in restricting activities of grantees). By July, 1985 Reagan had a confirmed

board; however, because confirmation occurred after January 1, 1985, the appropriations bill,
including the “affirmative riders” and guaranteed funding, stood. Congress increased the LSC
budget by 10.9%, a total of $305 million.
Johnson credits the Preservation of Legal Services for the Poor for influencing members
of Congress to defeat the LSC board’s attempt to restrict program lawyers. Appalled at how LSC
conducted its public meetings and how hostile the board treated others, three State Bar
Presidents, Michael Greco from Massachusetts, Jonathan Ross of New Hampshire, and William
Whitehurst of Texas, and bar executive Gail Kinney formed the Preservation. “What we were
seeing,” Ross recalled, “were Ronald Reagan nominees to the LSC Board who were basically
trying to bring about an end to the LSC.”182 The new “bar leaders” organization managed to get
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every State Bar Association to support them. This “grass roots” effort at advocacy could not be
barred by any restrictions from LSC or Congress. According to Earl Johnson, every year more
and more senators and Congressmen voted to support continuation of LSC funding, a trend
attributable to bar leaders for the Preservation of Legal Services for the Poor. Johnson also
credits Senator Warren Rudman (R-NH) for protecting Legal Services. Rudman used staff
member Tom Polgar to attend and report on LSC board meetings. Whenever LSC planned
anything detrimental to legal services, Rudman introduced “affirmative riders” to reverse board
decisions. Hence the Senate micromanaged the LSC board. This was the case in 1986, when
board member Pepe Mendez proposed a restructuring and defunding of support centers.183
The motion passed. Appropriations legislation for FY1987 effectively rescinded the vote with
an affirmative rider requiring funding of national and state support centers (back-up centers) at
FY1986 levels.
In 1987, Congress added a “negative rider” that prohibited Legal Services lawyers from
representing any kind of abortion case. That same year, the Shumway Amendment from the
House attacked LSC funding. “With an accumulated debt of well over $2 trillion,” argued
Norman Shumway of California, “I believe that we have a solemn obligation to subject every
program which is sponsored or subsidized by the Federal Government to the very strictest kind
of scrutiny.”184 With a 90 rating on John Birch Society’s conservative index, Shumway
represented California’s San Joaquin Valley, home of large agricultural businesses and
opponents of CRLA as well as thousands of poor migrant farm workers who needed LSC
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services. He argued that LSC had never been reauthorized by Reagan. Shumway lost the vote
by a 2-to-1 margin. Shortly after the House attack, LSC Chairman Clark Durant proposed
defunding support centers, with all funding going only to direct legal services for the poor. The
motion passed. Yet again, however, the full Congress instructed LSC to fund the support
centers for FY1988 at FY1987 levels. For FY1989, the Reagan administration made a budget
request of only $250 million, an amount $55 million dollars less than the previous year—the
exact amount needed to fund the support centers. The Reagan administration planned to
deplete LSC monies by first subsidizing field programs and then reasoning a lack of funds for
support centers.
In a last ditch effort, Reagan used the earlier “McCollum amendment” to curb LSC
activity. The 1982 amendment mandated that LSC grantee boards (comprised of a majority of
lawyers) consist only of those lawyers chosen by state and local bar associations. Furthermore,
Bar Associations had to represent the majority of lawyers in the area. This rule specifically
excluded lawyer members suggested by the NAACP, law schools and Community Action
agencies. On December 30, 1988, LSC President Terry Wear put all grantees on short funding.
Instead of annual grants, field programs received four-month grants. “Twenty-two field
programs and 10 national support centers were placed on two-month funding because they
didn’t comply with the new McCollum amendment…another eight…received one-month
funding because of ‘discrepancies’.”185
Although Reagan’s term ended in January 1989, his appointees continued to attack the
LSC. In 1989, Board Chairman Michael Wallace hired the Cooper Law firm to investigate the
185

“Legal Services Corporation authorizes temporary program funding to insure compliance with LSC regulations,”
PR Newswire, December 30, 1988.

75

constitutionality of LSC. Wallace spent $100,000 of the corporation’s money to do so.
Ultimately, the board was pressured to withdraw the challenge. On August 8, an article in the
Washington Post, “Stop us before we sue again” summarized the Reagan administration’s
attempt to abolish LSC, “The President should appoint a new board that won’t be ashamed to
serve,” read the article, “as for the rest...its time they were retired and replaced by those who
will spend their energies, and the public money, meeting the needs of the poor.”
Wear continued four-month short-funding into 1989, with support centers on a monthto-month basis. Wear believed in the idea of competitive bidding, and reasoned that private
law firms could replace current programs. In short, he aimed to substitute judicare for salaried
programs. In any case, his plan would eliminate funding to established legal aid programs,
especially those programs still advocating for the poor. According to an article in the New York
Times, “competitive bidding, would in fact supplant aggressive local programs with tamer
grantees.”186 “The last of the Reagan boards,” Johnson observed, “sought to restructure the
delivery system to narrow the range of services it offered poor people before handing it over to
an unknown commodity, the first Bush board.”187 Reagan’s forces had succeeded in narrowing
access to justice by limiting legal aid lawyers who engaged in class action suits or administrative
and legislative advocacy, as well as placing restrictions on abortion and undocumented
immigrant litigation.
In a 1986 response to Senator Phil Gramm’s (R-TX) unsuccessful proposal to defund LSC,
Senator Paul Simon (D-IL) made a strong case for the continuance of LSC for future generations
to come,
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My friend from Texas cites abuses. He could get two of his students to write a book
about abuses in the field of agriculture…in any field. Obviously, you can get a book
about abuses in the field of religion…The gauge of something is not whether there are
occasional abuses but whether the program as a whole is a good program and a needed
program…I think there are ways of solving our budget problems without reaching down
to the poorest of the poor, as this amendment does.188
Together, with negative riders, a constitutional challenge, and the ABA's silence, the
Reagan administration used zero-based budgeting, aggressive and intimidating investigations,
swift enforcement of violations, and short-funding tactics to successfully narrow the range of
legal services available to the poor. In addition to thwarting the effectiveness of LSC-funded
programs, efforts were made to establish alternatives to legal aid such as judicare and private
attorney involvement. Thus, in the late 1980s LSC began eliminating its programs’ reliance on
federal funds, as its officials searched for private non-LSC funds such as IOLTA and pushed for
private attorney involvement as an alternative to the legal aid attorney.
IOLTA

LSC President Bogard created Program Development (PD) in 1983 to promote the use of
outside funding and find alternative means to providing legal services. Considered a positive
alternative funding source, “Interest on Lawyers Trust Accounts” (IOLTA) emerged during the
Reagan administration.189 IOLTA won bipartisan support because it increased money for legal
aid programs but did not require federal funding to do so. Gaining traction in 1983 in Florida
and then in California, IOLTA had become the leading private supplier of funding for legal
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services. To date all 50 states and the District of Columbia have IOLTA. Notably, IOLTA is
dependent upon interest rates, consequently during recessions and in deflationary periods
when interest rates drop, so do the amounts of IOLTA money.
Private Attorney Involvement (PAI)

According to Houseman, most legal services programs used a staff attorney system;
however, in the early 1980s, the ABA and LSC looked to add Private Attorney Involvement (PAI)
in providing legal services.190 In a nod to Reagan, the ABA adopted a resolution urging an LSC
amendment to include opportunities for private attorneys in delivering legal services to the
poor. Beginning in 1981, before Congress could act, the LSC board and staff directed grantees
to include PAI. Originally requested at 10 percent of funds, by 1984 LSC required grantees to
spend 12.5 percent of their funds on PAI. Most programs increased their Pro Bono activities
while some bolstered private contracts and or judicare. In 1979, “sixteen experimental judicare
programs were being funded at a total cost of over $1.5 million.”191 According to Houseman,
PAI reduced the hostility of private lawyers, the ABA, and state and local bars toward the LSC.
In 2004 LSC-funded programs closed 102,972 PAI cases of which approximately 71% were Pro
Bono. As of 2013, Pro Bono cases constituted over 82% with contracts and judicare closing
16,910 cases. A total of 30,465 attorneys accepted referrals.
Other Services

During the Reagan Administration, the ABA also looked for alternative delivery
methods such as “self-help, legal clinics, pre-paid and lawyer referral services, alternative
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dispute resolution, and arbitration.” 192 Other than lawyer referral services which matched
issues with attorneys for fees, these approaches provided alternatives to legal aid
attorneys. Together, private non-LSC funds, PAI, and self-help employed Reginald Heber
Smith’s suggestions of: Pro Se or “representing one’s self,” making the attorney’s services
unnecessary, and providing an attorney through charitable means. Other than legal clinics,
most methods of these approaches are still in use today.
Over time, additional IOLTA funds, more attorneys through PAI, and alternative
delivery methods increased LSC program resources, which ultimately expanded the reach of
legal services in general. Another development, the use of Paraprofessionals also helped
meet the demand for legal services. Paraprofessional services involving paralegals existed
before LSC and Program Development’s search for alternatives. By 1978 “the total number
of…paralegals involved in legal services work in the United States [was] reported to be 1,500,
compared to 3,700 lawyers.”193 The use of paralegals under the umbrella of an attorney greatly
increased manpower by cutting down on employee costs.194
The Bush Administration
According to the NLADA, “By 1990, the poor were served by many fewer legal services
attorneys than in 1981, when the modest level of minimum access was briefly achieved.”195 In
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other words, Reagan succeeded in narrowing access to justice below the minimum access
levels. By President George H.W. Bush’s Administration, a concerned ABA took an active role in
vetting board nominees in favor of LSC’s future. The ABA assigned the Standing Committee on
Legal Aid to conduct confidential reviews. Although not overtly hostile, President Bush tried to
flat line the LSC budget each year while Congress continued to appropriate greater amounts.
By contrast, Bush’s nominees greatly eased the tension between the LSC and its grantees.
Senator Rudman, who had done so much to help LSC, described the new nominees as “fairminded people who did not show antipathy for legal services.”196 Board Chairman George
Witgraff was integral in building better relations between LSC, private lawyers, and LSC
grantees. Witgraff invited legal aid lawyers, board members, and clients throughout the
country to attend scheduled board meetings. The meetings provided presentations and
important information about what LSC was all about. By providing new information, LSC helped
many board members realize that LSC lawyers were not “bomb throwers” but hardworking
professionals. Even Norman Shumway (an earlier opponent) spoke about the learned benefits
of LSC. He pointed out three major LSC accomplishments: appropriations had grown from
$295 million in 1990 to $357 million in 1993; LSC had increased oversight of programs (leading
to decreased paperwork); and LSC and grantees developed better relationships—a result of
annual joint conferences by Witgraff. In addition, LSC began basing some grants on merit and
innovation, a nod to the OEO days.
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Republican Revolution
In 1992 proponents believed that President Bill Clinton’s election would mean greater
funding and security for LSC. After all, his wife had served as an LSC chairperson. With
Clinton’s nominees supporting a strong and broad role for LSC, along with a huge increase in
appropriations reaching $400 million for FY1994 and FY1995, the future looked bright.
Unexpectedly, the “Republican Revolution” changed everything. During the 1994 congressional
elections, Republicans gained 54 seats in the House and 8 in the Senate. By January 1995
Republicans won control of both houses for the first time since 1952. Speaker of the House
Newt Gingrich (R-GA) spearheaded the revolution.
The following year, Congress passed the greatest restrictions on legal aid delivery in LSC
history. Former Executive Director of the Center for Law and Social Policy (CLASP) Alan
Houseman described the political parallel.197 “In much the same way as the Reagan
Administration in the early 1980s, the leadership of the new Congress, under Gingrich,
committed itself to the elimination of LSC and ending federal funding for legal services.”198
Described as the “glide path to elimination,” Gingrich and the House planned to
eventually eliminate funding for LSC.199 A bipartisan majority in Congress supported funding for
LSC, but not before a compromise with major reforms was struck. Both the House and Senate
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added prohibitions to the appropriations bill. Restrictions included prohibitions on such
political activities as voter registration and organizing activities within labor unions, etc.
Grantees could not lobby government offices, agencies, or legislative bodies. Lawyers could not
solicit clients. With the exception of Indian Tribal Courts, lawyers could not take criminal cases,
abortion cases, military cases, assisted suicide cases, or cases involving the desegregation of
schools. Lawyers could no longer perform class actions. Lawyers could no longer represent
prisoners, people evicted from public housing due to criminal charges of illegal drugs, and with
limited exception, could not represent aliens. Congress also prohibited most activities
promoting welfare reform and other liberal agenda items.200
Houseman’s Securing Equal Justice for All details additional changes. Funding for
grantees was to be based solely on a census of the poor and the staff needed to administer a
timekeeping system. Grantees were restricted from receiving attorney’s fees, and could no
longer use funds to pay dues or to sue LSC. In addition, the Office of Inspector General (OIG)
was granted greater power to perform audits, and LSC was given greater access to client
records.201
Along with the restrictions, Congress slashed LSC’s budget by more than 30 percent.
FY1996 appropriations for LSC included $269.4 million for basic field programs, $1.5 million for
the OIG and $7.1 million for management and administration. Cuts in funding led to a loss of
300 local programs, and 900 attorneys—an estimated loss of 300,000 cases annually.
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To make matters worse, Congress not only placed restrictions on LSC-funded money,
but prohibited LSC recipients from using public or private funds for LSC-restricted activities as
well.202 In other words, any program receiving LSC funds must apply LSC restrictions to all nonLSC funds. “Congress...determined that federal funds should go only to those legal services
programs that focused on individual representation and concentrated on clients’ day-to-day
legal problems,” noted Houseman, “while broader efforts to address the more general systemic
problems of the client community and to ameliorate poverty should be left to those entities
that did not receive LSC funds.”203In addition, Congress eliminated funding for support centers.
End of Support Centers
Before the LSC bill passed, the House Committee tacked on the “Green Amendment.”
Congresswoman Edith Green argued that research, training, technical assistance, and
information clearinghouse services should not be part of the lawyers’ position, but a service by
LSC if necessary. In this manner, law reform could be reined in and ultimately eliminated. In
short, the amendment ended grants and funding for back-up centers. But due to vague
wording, it did not have the effect Republicans thought it would. It did not prohibit back-up
centers or legal research on behalf of litigation; after all, research was part of a lawyer’s work.
In the end, the LSC board agreed to conduct training and technical assistance as well as provide
clearinghouse services in house. As for research, LSC began referring to back-up centers as
“support centers” and offered contracts instead of grants to continue their work. In this
manner, LSC held some control over the research. During the Reagan years, these centers
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survived mainly because of “affirmative riders” attached to the LSC appropriations bills. These
“riders” and LSC-funding for support centers lasted until the “Republican Revolution” and
ensuing major attack on LSC. New restrictions ended funding for the support centers. Without
federal money only a few of the national support centers survived; by expanding their focus
beyond poverty they were able to attract other financing. As of 2007 only 12 state programs
were former LSC-funded support centers. According to Houseman,
State and national support centers; the national Clearinghouse for Legal Services, which
published the poverty law journal The Clearinghouse Review; and various training
programs, had developed quality standards, engaged in delivery research, provided
training to support legal services advocacy, and served as the infrastructure that linked
all of the LSC-funded providers into a single national legal services program.204
The link had been severed.
State-based Planning

In anticipation of federal cuts, LSC embarked on a new approach that emphasized
statewide delivery systems. The plan involved a unified state justice system that included LSC
and non-LSC service providers—Pro Bono programs, law schools, private bars and others
working in collaboration. Focus shifted from local control to a state’s collective responsibility
for providing legal services. LSC promoted the use of centralized telephone systems, a sense of
equitable distribution among programs and areas, and access to both urban and rural clients to
achieve the goal of this new state-level advocacy system.
With new restrictions on non-LSC funds, many states developed separate non-LSC
funded legal services providers. In fact, many of today’s non-LSC funded programs are “spinoffs” of LSC recipients. By remaining unrestricted, “spin-off” programs could continue engaging
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in class actions, working on welfare reform, assisting aliens and prisoners, and more, so long as
their new funders allowed them to. Thus many states offered parallel legal services programs.
In 2007, 16 states operated parallel programs and in some jurisdictions the private bars
provided basic legal services.
LSC also encouraged states to consolidate multiple local LSC-funded programs into
regional or statewide programs, a process described as “merger mania.” Due to mergers and
overall reconfiguration, the number of programs decreased: from 1995 to 1998, the number of
LSC basic field and Native American programs fell from 288 to 261, as 27 programs were
merged.205 In 1995 there were 325 programs; by the end of merger mania in 2006, there were
138. In 2015 there were 134 programs.
Program Changes

Since the statewide initiative began, an increasing number of states have created
“Access to Justice” commissions, which include representatives from the courts, bars, legal
services and more.206 Thus, as part of access to justice, many programs work with a partnership
of stakeholders within the justice system of each state. Many programs have also looked for
new sources of money. Aside from private sources, programs sought and received new sources
of non-LSC funding under VAWA, (Violence Against Women Act), the Housing and Urban
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Development (HUD), the IRS, and other federal agencies. Programs also secured money
through state and local governments or agencies.207
Programs also changed the manner in which they delivered services. In the 1990s
programs created telephone hotlines to “screen cases, provide legal advice or brief service, and
make referrals to private attorneys and other sources of legal assistance.”208 In the twenty-first
century, with the advent of the information age and internet growth, access improved further,
as programs built websites to provide substantive legal information (in multiple languages),
online intake systems, online forms, videos, chat capability and simplified step-by-step
instructions. In addition, many courts offered similar services along with electronic filing and
payment options. Not surprisingly, while technology played a large role in facilitating access to
legal services, it has not dramatically increased access to justice.
In the 1990s a grass roots effort to improve access to justice for the poor slowly
coalesced into a nascent movement dubbed “Access 2 Justice.” Stakeholders realized that
adding more lawyers was not reducing the justice gap.209 Founder and leader of Access 2
Justice (A2J) Richard Zorza worked with stakeholders and existing programs to leverage
technology in promoting information, and supporting self-represented litigants. From this early
movement emerged A2J, Pro Bono Net, and Law Help, which together provide interactive
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online document assembly, Pro Bono information including a pleading bank, program portals,
and websites respectively. Joining the technology boom in 1997, the ABA committee on the
Delivery of Legal Services started its first email listserv. By 1988, the OIG supported an A2J
project, which led to LSC’s Technology Initiative Grant or TIG program. According to LSC, the
technology initiative has funded 570 projects totaling $46 million. The program is effective in
promoting the goal of access to justice.210
Programs also provide other services such as legal education workshops, referral
services, and Pro Se self-help materials. In 2013 grantees made referrals to over 233,000 other
legal service providers, over 285,000 lawyers (LRIS & individual), and over 52,000 (non-legal)
human or social services programs. Over 305,000 people attended legal education
presentations, and 49,672 people went to Pro Se clinics or workshops.
The End of Restrictions

The Republican Revolution and ensuing restrictions buttressed the Reagan era
initiatives of private funding, private attorney involvement, and alternative delivery methods of
Pro Se and self-help as programs fought to continue providing the same level of access to
justice for clients. With decreased funding and added restrictions, Access to Justice required a
comprehensive safety net for the poor—something other than LSC-funded programs.
No new restrictions have been implemented to date. Opponents continue with
moderate attacks on LSC, but after the 1996 prohibitions, growing oversight, and monitoring of
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program performance, there is little left to contest.211 According to LSC, “since 1996, bipartisan
support in Congress for LSC has continued to grow.” 212 From the $278 million in FY1996,
appropriations for LSC slowly increased to $283 million the following year, with strong increases
in FY1996, FY2001, FY2007, FY2009, to a recalibrated high-water mark of $420 million in 2010.
Notably, LSC removed restrictions on collecting attorney’s fees in 2010.
According to Alan Houseman and Linda Perle, the LSC restrictions of 1996 diminished
the capacity of legal services programs and staff to “effectively represent low-income persons
in the courts and before other forums that affect their rights and responsibilities.” However,
they argue that “over 95% of the work done in legal services in 1995 can continue today and
over 98% of the cases brought to court in 1995 can still be brought.”213

Diminished Capacity
Although Houseman’s and Perle’s statistics indicate that LSC programs can continue
doing 95 percent of their work and bring 98 percent of their cases, they do not diminish the
catastrophic impact that restrictions have had on narrowing the poor’s access to justice. “Not
being able to do class actions means that there is a whole level of remedy that is not available
to clients,” says AnnaMarie Johnson, “there are things that we would like to correct, but you
can’t do it with one individual.”214 For instance, Johnson describes a major problem currently
afflicting the process:
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There is a nationwide organization that is scamming people on foreclosure and
foreclosure assistance… what they can do with the one client is moot them out by giving
them their money back and correcting the problem...what we need to do is have a class
action…so you can actually get at their business practices and put them out of
business.215

A restriction on class actions prevents programs from effectively combating such problems as
consumer fraud and predatory lending practices, as well as any other act that adversely affects
a multitude of clients. Her example describes a real inability for legal services to stop corrupt
practices, and so the scam continues.
Restrictions on lobbying also limit a program’s ability to help their clients. “Sometimes
our clients’ voices need to be heard at the legislature,” as Johnson correctly observed, “the
problems and issues that the legislature is putting through, how it affects the poor and what
they can do to help the poor is not being heard…they have affectively silenced us on that.”216
According to Jon Sasser, who currently lobbies on behalf of the poor in Nevada, much of the
2015 state legislative session involved defensive work. Sasser worked to “cure” or amend
Assembly Bill (AB) 386, Senate Bill (SB) 58, and AB 195, among others. AB 386 established
procedures to deal with squatters, but made unintentional changes to landlord tenant law.
Sasser consulted with tenant advocates while working closely on drafting and amending the bill
with interested parties. SB 58 initially allowed additional parties to view information related to
children within the juvenile court system or in protective custody. Sasser worked to
successfully limit the bill to only those people within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. AB
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195 removed requirements on deficiency judgments in foreclosures. 217 His work also limited
the scope of judgment to commercial property only.
Sasser labels bills as “cured,” “concerned” and “killed”. In 2015, under this taxonomy he
was concerned about SB 239, SB 193 and other bills. SB 239 shortened the timeline after
foreclosures to sue for wrongful foreclosure, and SB 193 removed requirements to pay
overtime for hours worked in excess of 8 hours in any workday for minimum wage workers.
Sasser also helped to “kill” bills such as SB 123, AB 228, AB 102 and SB 255. SB 123 would have
removed restrictions on payday lenders, AB 228 would have allowed GPS tracking devices to be
installed in cars for people with poor credit, and AB 102 would have allowed an initial waiver of
reasonable efforts to be used as proof in a termination of parental rights trial, while SB 255
would have required putative fathers to register with the state or forfeit parental rights.218
Sasser’s work provides examples of how legislative advocacy is critical in protecting the
poor and Nevadans in general. Without advocacy to amend or terminate harmful laws, the
problems of the poor will only multiply and legal services programs will be further taxed to
meet the increased demand for their services regarding family, juvenile, employment,
consumer, and housing issues. Today, LSC prohibits recipients from engaging in legislative
lobbying activities including agency rulemaking or advocacy training. Unless recipients are
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invited to participate in providing an opinion on behalf of the poor, they are restricted from
advocating for them.
Additional restrictions limit the number of eligible clients. According to Johnson, “there
are plenty of organizations to take up restricted cases such as abortion, or euthanasia,” but
funding and resources are limited.219 There still remains a section of the poor unable to afford
representation such as the military, prisoners, criminals, those charged with possessing illegal
drugs, and immigrants. In such cases, for example, vulnerable immigrants have no legal
recourse against workplace abuses and “efforts to help prisoners reenter society are needlessly
postponed.”220 Ultimately, an LSC program’s survival and ability to service all clients relies on
funding, and the restrictions placed on that funding diminishes the legal services attorney’s
capacity to effectively represent the poor in court and other forums.
Together, inadequate funding and added restrictions negatively affect access to justice
for the poor. As Chair John G. Levi remarked at the LSC Board of Directors meeting in 2015, “In
its first year…the fledgling LSC was allocated—in inflation-adjusted terms—more than $468
million, rising three years later to its all-time high of what today would be $880 million.”221 In
2013, Congress appropriated $340,876,165 for LSC, well below the 1976 level. The effect is
stark. In 1971 the OEO-SP served approximately 1.2 million clients annually with an inflationadjusted $320 million. In 2013 LSC programs closed a cumulative 758,689 cases with
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appropriations of $340.8 million. According to Levi, in 2013 nearly one in three Americans, or
96 million people qualified for LSC services.222
How is it that funding and poverty population increased while the number of cases
closed decreased? Since statistics reflect no major change in the type of casework being done
since the OEO-LSP days, the answer lies primarily in funding and reporting.223 Ominously, in
2013 the entire $340.8 million allocated never reached the field programs.224 The
appropriations act reduced total funding to $316 million. Notably six percent of the money
allocated went to migrant and Native American work—the types of cases that require more
travel and research, as clients are difficult to locate and are typically in distant rural areas.
Lower case numbers also reflect a decreasing number of LSC-funded cases.225 From
1996 to 2013, the percentage of LSC funds to non-LSC-funds provided to programs overall
decreased from 59.67 percent to 38.73 percent. An increase in non-LSC funds is generally
considered to be good, but non-LSC funds are particularly vulnerable to market conditions. In
2010, non-LSC funding reached its highest point at approximately $578.7 million. Since the subprime mortgage crisis in 2009, non-LSC funds have fallen, due largely to a decline in real estate
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transactions made by lawyers, which contributes the largest amount to IOLTA accounts. IOLTA
accounts also rise and fall with the federal rate, which the Federal Reserve slashed in response
to the recession. Thus IOLTA, the second largest contributor to legal services, declined
dramatically. Along with the decrease in IOLTA funds, federal, state and other non-LSC funds
decreased. By 2013, non-LSC funding fell to $542 million, of which IOLTA accounted for only 5.6
percent.
LSC’s restriction on the use of non-LSC funds extends further each year, as LSC’s
percentage of contribution to total funds diminishes. According to the Brennan Center, “the
restriction is an unnecessary federal overreach that interferes with choices of state, local and
private charitable donors about how to spend their money.”226 This long reach into non-LSC
funds not only places restrictions on programs, but can affect the efficiency and effectiveness of
legal services in general. As mentioned, in 1996 many “spin-off” programs were created in
response to that particular restriction, leading to parallel legal services within states. As part of
the Nevada Access to Justice Commission, Justice Douglas meets with providers regularly in an
effort to fill gaps, and prevent overlap or duplication of legal services. Why? Because an
overlap signifies an ineffective use of money and manpower, which could be used to provide
missing services. Justice Douglas would prefer a unified statewide legal services program, but
describes the problem associated with it,
One can’t do it by itself. In one case, if we had nothing but pure open-ended providers
doing it right now, we wouldn’t be getting the federal money. And if we didn’t have
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those folks who are doing it without the federal restrictions, they would have more
money but then there would be a number of things they couldn’t do.227
Without restrictions, programs could augment rather than cut their services. By sharing funds,
they could eliminate unnecessary overhead, administrative, and personnel costs, and put their
cost-savings into filling gaps in services.
Another argument against restrictions is that they implement internal contradictions
that may diminish professional capacity. Lisa Wirtz argues that “Professionalism requires
lawyers to transcend the bottom-line orientation of their profession and to serve such
overarching goals as social justice and public interest…Professionalism highlights qualities
including autonomy and honesty.”228 Her opinion suggests a conflict between LSC restrictions
and a lawyer’s Canon of Ethics. This dilemma first surfaced with MFY, the Neighborhood
Lawyer Program, when lay members attempted to interfere with a lawyer’s conduct. As noted
earlier, in 1963 Judge Florence Kelley upheld the “importance of maintaining the purity of the
relationship between a lawyer and his client,” even if it meant jeopardizing the organization’s
relationships.229 This raised an important question: does a denial of clients’ rights due to
ineligibility satisfy the requirements of a legal services attorney’s canon of ethics?

A Matter of Right
When Justice Earl Johnson, Jr. (Ret.) delivered his keynote speech at the Pathways to
Justice Conference in 2008 he was struck by a certain symmetry: “44 years of justice for the
poor being a matter of private charity, followed by another 44 years of justice for the poor
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being a matter largely of discretionary government funding.”230 And on the horizon, he
believed, was a third phase: justice for the poor as a matter of right.
A year later, LSC issued a Justice Gap report identifying the gap between available
resources for legal services and the legal needs of the poor, in other words, the unmet civil legal
needs. The report stated that “nationally, on average, only one legal aid attorney is available to
serve 6,415 low-income people,” well below the minimum access goal of two lawyers per
10,000 people.231 In 2009, the report indicated that for every client helped by an LSC-funded
program one person was turned away. “That’s a low statistic today,” says AnnaMarie Johnson,
“It’s much higher. I think that for every one person assisted five are turned away.”232 The
report also tracked an increasing number of poor people appearing in state courts without
attorneys, with an increasing number of unrepresented litigants in family and housing courts.233
The majority of the poor were not receiving counsel. Finally, the report recognized that not all
of the poor’s legal problems were even addressed with the help of an attorney.
On what horizon did Justice Earl Johnson see justice as a matter of right? Did he
imagine a civil Gideon? According to Sasser, “None of the legal aids, since Gideon v.
Wainwright, have gotten any kind of funding, to my knowledge, to do criminal work…there was
already a funding mechanism for criminal as the public defenders offices.” 234 A liberal

230

Johnson, Earl Jr. “Three Phases of Justice for the Poor: From Charity to Discretion to Right.” Closing Keynote
Speech, Pathways to Justice Conference, Los Angeles, CA, June 7, 2008.
231
“Documenting the Justice Gap in America: An Updated Report of the Legal Services Corporation,” Legal Services
Corporation, last modified September 30, 2009, http://www.lsc.gov/media/press-releases/lsc-releases-updatedreport-justice-gap-america.
232
Interview with AnnaMarie Johnson by Todd Ashmore, March 25, 2015.
233
“Documenting the Justice Gap,”27.
234
According to Jon, the NLADA and programs such as the legal aid society of New York provide both types of
representation, but they have separate criminal and civil arms. There lawyers are separated within those
branches. Only a few programs have both under their umbrella.

95

Democrat, lobbyist, and lifelong legal aid attorney, Sasser believes in implementing a civil
Gideon. “If you are in civil law and not criminal law there is not a uniform right to have an
attorney appointed to you. So there are those radicals out there that would like to see there be
a civil Gideon. Then you have a right to an attorney in all kinds of cases.”235When asked if he
would like to see a civil Gideon, Justice Douglas responded, “I would. I don’t think I will.”
Douglas believes it is a money issue. “California has attempted it. I see a number of states
trying to get a civil Gideon,” says Douglas, “We barely commit sufficient resources to a criminal
Gideon, in the true sense. And we keep trying to figure out ways to limit [that]…to keep the
cost down.”236 When asked if a civil Gideon was on the horizon, former Executive Director of
Nevada Legal Services (NLS), Carolyn Worrell predicted, “Not in our lifetime are we going to see
a Civil Gideon, unfortunately.” Current Executive Director of NLS, AnnaMarie Johnson
answered, “I do. I have no idea how to make that work in a real world manner. But I do believe
in it. I think we can make it work.” Similar to the others, Johnson’s response seemed to support
the undertaking, but a civil Gideon, at least in the sense of a criminal Gideon with a right to an
attorney, did not seem a present reality. According to Justice Douglas, the closest civil Gideon
is some kind of legal services program:
What was put out there, whether it is funded by the United States government or by the
state in some form: state direct grant of money or money from various filing fees, that
appears, at least in the present, the way were are going to have a civil Gideon. We will
provide attorneys for people who are below this, and then by putting a Pro Bono
position we can deal with those people who are actually above the cap limit, if they
have certain kinds of cases falling in certain areas.237
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Without the right to civil legal representation, the duty of access to justice falls mainly
upon legal services providers. As the major funder of legal services programs in the United
States, LSC’s mission is to “promote equal access to justice in our Nation and to provide high
quality civil legal assistance to low income persons.”238 How well do LSC’s initiatives provide
access to justice for the poor? There are problems associated with the current corporation’s
initiatives, which promote the use of non-LSC funds such as IOLTA, Private Attorney
involvement or PAI such as Pro Bono, and Pro Se or self-help for clients with some form of legal
education and information.
LSC’s restrictions on non-LSC funds harken back to the days of the Republican
Revolution in the mid-1990s and have resulted in parallel programs with independent boards
and administrations. Aside from the additional overhead needed to operate multiple programs,
more action is needed to coordinate legal services. Justice Douglas explained the difficulty of
cooperation,
Each legal services organization, on both sides, is fighting for dollars. They are fighting
for their survival. We know they get LSC money; they should be entitled to some of the
state dollars. We have one provider on the other side that says, “No, they get that
money, they shouldn’t need any of this.” But it’s like wait a minute, you’re not
providing that service that they provide. So we have stepped in…trying to coordinate
and nurture, convince them to do it a different way.239
LSC restrictions have resulted in parallel programs fighting with each other over money.
LSC’s Pro Se and Pro Bono initiatives also remind one of the Nixon, Reagan and Gingrich
years, when Republicans, conservatives and others attacked the OEO-LSP and LSC respectively.
They viewed federally-funded programs as welfare and promoted private-charity ideas such as
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PAI. Pro Se initiatives pushed for self-reliance based on the assumption that a person did not
require assistance, because they were responsible for their own needs. These initiatives deny
the fact that some poor Americans require assistance from a federally-funded program.
The problem associated with Pro Se is that it does not secure justice for the poor. The
use of technology has increased the amount of information available to clients, and legal
education from classes to pamphlets help educate them, but there is no guarantee that it
results in a strong Pro Se defense. According to Justice Douglas, litigation is very difficult for the
poor, because they are always at a distinct disadvantage. Not only must they understand
formal pleadings, but if there is an attorney on the other side, they must know the procedure
and rules of court. “It’s like a three year-old playing a twelve year-old in basketball, and there is
a height advantage,” mused Douglas, “ You know the outcome before it starts.”240
Self-representing clients because they do not know the procedures or rules of the court
also slow down the court’s docket. According to Bankruptcy Judge Linda Riegle, “sometimes
clients just need someone to listen to them and tell them of their options, sometimes they
need an attorney.”241 Judge Riegle who spends a majority of her time advising Pro Se litigants
about their rights and the correct procedures, urged the use of attorneys to help streamline the
court process.
LSC’s PAI initiative promotes the use of Pro Bono, but there is no guarantee that private
attorneys will take the case, let alone be knowledgeable in that field of law. “We have a lot of
lawyers who say they are native domestic Pro Bono,” said Douglas, “Well, we have high
powered attorneys, but not in family law.” In other words, there is an educational process or
240
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learning curve for Pro Bono. He continues, “Whether it’s just divorce, child custody or
termination of parental rights, they need a mentor to get them through this.” Therefore, some
attorneys willing to take a case Pro Bono run the risk of inadequately representing clients or in
some cases committing malpractice. According to Douglas, sometimes Pro Bono is just a
matter of a private family law attorney taking a Pro Bono case in family law. He doesn’t see
any comparatively better skill from a legal services attorney representing the poor, but
recognizes, that “what they have is specialized knowledge in a specific area, where in some
cases, the traditional for profit attorney doesn’t.”242 The concern for added reliance on private
attorney involvement and less reliance on legal aid attorneys is that legal aid attorneys dedicate
time and effort and increasing experience in resolving issues specifically related to the poor.
This is not always the case with private attorneys.
LSC’s PAI and Pro Bono initiatives, the push for Pro Se or self-representation, and the
assumed reliance on non-LSC funds are all part of the meshwork of civil legal representation for
the poor. The increased reliance on non-LSC funds, PAI and self-help suggest a legal services
trajectory more in line with the private charity days of the early legal aid movement than the
ideal of justice as a matter of right.
LSC’s vulnerability to political opinion, largely between two dominating political parties,
the Democrats and Republicans, result in a clash between liberal and conservative viewpoints
as well as a range of opinions in between. According to Douglas, “part of the society we live in
says ‘well you made your bed, so what?’ And the other says ‘the so what is, you have a right to
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be treated fairly and equally before the law.”243 The historical battles over LSC resulted in a
hobbled program; indeed, the early goal of “minimum access” is still not being met.
Meanwhile, restrictions, limited LSC-funds, and an increasing percentage of non-LSC funds tied
to economic downturns narrow equal access to justice for the poor.244 Nixon’s 1971 message to
Congress, is still relevant today: it is the poor who pay for LSC’s indecision,
Here each day the old, the unemployed, the underprivileged, and the largely forgotten
people of our Nation may seek help. Perhaps it is an eviction, a marital conflict,
repossession of a car, or misunderstanding over a welfare check—each problem may
have a legal solution. These are small claims in the Nation’s eye, but they loom large in
the hearts and lives of poor Americans.245

To date, LSC is the largest funder of civil legal aid for low-income Americans. To fulfill its
mission, the corporation distributes over 90 percent of its funding to 134 independent nonprofit legal aid programs throughout the nation. As noted earlier, LSC provides funding through
a competitive grant process, basing the size of grants upon the number of people living in
poverty in a given state or geographic area. Thus, LSC grantees exist in every state of the
Union to provide America’s poverty population with legal counsel for civil issues. Nevada Legal
Services is the sole LSC recipient in Nevada.
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Nevada Legal Services
The only thing less popular than a poor person, these days, is a poor person with a lawyer.
—Jon D. Asher, Legal Aid Society of Denver, 1995
If you’re in a position where you can’t afford to attain an attorney, you’re not a full citizen.
—Justice Michael Douglas, 2015

Introduction
The history of Nevada Legal Services (NLS) parallels much of the history of the national
movements from the legal aid societies to LSC-funded programs today. NLS is a concrete
example of how Congress and LSC limited access to justice by curtailing programs and the
effective attorneys who attempted to challenge inequality and combat deep-rooted poverty in
America. Legal services attorneys were more effective in fighting poverty before the LSC
restrictions of the 1970s and later decades. The days of legal services, before the restrictions,
demonstrate how legal services attorneys were more influential when the entire toolkit for
lawyers was available. Annelise Orleck’s Storming Caesars Palace describes the humiliation Las
Vegas welfare mothers were subjected to and the animosity they met when attempting to
secure federal and state aid. At the time, legal services served as an empowering venue for
clients such as Ruby Duncan who fought for justice and demanded greater rights for the poor.
A closer look at NLS reveals a group of legal services attorneys who believe in a civil
Gideon and in their unique ways still fight a “War on Poverty.” NLS today provides access to
justice, but not as well as it did before Congress and LSC stifled the program’s effectiveness by
placing restrictions on the type of legal activities attorneys could engage in and the kinds of
clients they could represent.
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This chapter provides the history of the Clark County Legal Aid Society (CCLAS) and its
association with Ruby Duncan and the Clark County Welfare Rights Organization (CCWRO),
specifically with their work in the late 1960s to mid-1970s welfare rights movement. It follows
CCLAS during the OEO-LSP and LSC changes, up to its merger in 1982 with the Nevada IndianRural Legal Services program to form Nevada Legal Services. It addresses the LSC restrictions
and the eventual "spin-off" of the Clark County Legal Services program (CCLS), which created
parallel programs in Nevada. Next, a history of general access to justice is provided to describe
the work NLS has done through Nevada's population boom and housing crisis. It then offers a
brief examination of the dedicated employees and people who have provided legal services.
Finally, it addresses the limitations of access to justice and the purging of effective legal services
leaders such as former Executive Director Wayne Pressel.

Clark County Legal Services
Sponsored by the Clark County Bar Association (CCBA) and initially funded by Justice of
the Peace Art Olsen, the Clark County Legal Aid Society (CCLAS) formed in 1958 near the end of
the legal aid movement.246 Before any OEO funding was available, CCLAS, like other legal aid
societies, met the growing need for legal services through charitable donations by the United
Fund, hosted fundraisers, and private donations of time and money.247 Within its first year,
CCLAS screened approximately 575 applicants. According to Jon Sasser, “[In] 1960 more than
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CCLAS was located at 515 S. 5 St, LV 89101. Justice of the Peace Art Olsen donated a month of wedding
receipts toward the CCLAS startup. The society began with President John Foley and executive secretary Mrs.
Jacqueline Sylvester. The bar association selected the 10-member Board of Trustees annually.
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When CCLAS first moved its location to 1622 S St., and later to 214 Maryland Parkway, the wives of the
attorneys donated furniture and their time in decorating the offices. The wives also used fund-raising activities
such as home tours to help support legal aid. Thirteen wives donated their time to the operation of the program
to allow the executive secretary, Mrs. Gerry Hyland to take vacation.
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1000 applicants had been processed with service provided to 350 individuals.”248 CCLAS began
as a Pro Bono program. The only paid position, the Executive Secretary, screened calls and
referred prospective clients to volunteer CCBA members. CCLAS also created a lawyer referral
service for those who could afford services (1961). “In 1963 over 700 people were
interviewed,” said Sasser, and in 1964, “844 persons sought aid [while another] 325 were
directed to a panel of 43 [volunteer] attorneys.”249 A year later, future Governor and U.S.
Senator Richard Bryan joined the board.250 Notably, Bryan was the first public defender in Las
Vegas (1966).
In 1966, in response to the war on poverty, a neighborhood legal assistance program
formed in Clark County. Staffed by two volunteer attorneys, the neighborhood program offered
after hours (6 PM to 9PM) legal services to three low income neighborhoods within Las Vegas.
With applications of 1,000 to 1,200 annually, the program became a strong candidate for OEO
funds. Nevertheless, LSP chose to fund CCLAS. Why did OEO-LSP Director Bamberger, with an
urgency to meet his funding deadline, choose CCLAS over a Great Society program? Although
the neighborhood program was designed to fight poverty, it was hardly established in the legal
arena. With a proven track record of helping the poor and a well-established and ongoing
relationship with the local bar, CCLAS was the better choice, at least as a program that could be
administered by attorneys.251 True to legal aid form, CCLAS struggled with the idea of using
government funds. In 1967, “after a bitter fight among members,” says Sasser, “the Clark
248
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County Legal Aid Society applied to OEO for $20,000 in federal funds.”252 The OEO awarded a
$22,000 joint grant to CCLAS and the Clark County Economic Opportunity Board. Together, the
programs would use the grant to serve the 7,000 Clark County families with incomes of less
than $3,000 a year.
In 1968, with OEO funds, CCLAS became a major program in Southern Nevada’s War on
Poverty, with 13 attorneys and 8 low-income clients, the new board adopted the “Citizen
Perspective.” Mario Ventura, a staff Judge Advocate at Nellis Air Force Base, became the first
paid CCLAS staff attorney. With a full-time attorney and legal secretary, CCLAS offered a
minimum of sixty-four hours of monthly service at anti-poverty centers located in the Westside,
North Las Vegas and Henderson areas. According to Ventura’s report, CCLAS helped 153 clients
in the last quarter of 1968.253 Based on client needs, Ventura dealt with an increase in
insurance and Social Security claims, as well as a rise in landlord/tenant issues. Fourteen of
Ventura’s cases went to court.254 In 1969, with Don Poole and future Director Mahlon Brown
III, CCLAS officially offered a Pro Bono program and increased staff to meet the growing
demand for legal aid.255 In 1970 CCLAS officially changed its name to Clark County Legal
Services (CCLS). That same year, quelling any concern that it might not be fighting a war on
poverty, CCLS agreed to represent Ruby Duncan and thousands of other welfare recipients.256
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Bogeyman and Bogeywoman
Welfare was anathema to the rugged individualist self-image and libertarian tradition
that many white Silver State residents and politicians cherished. In 1955, Nevada was the last
state in the Union to accept Aid to Dependent Children (ADC).257 Although the ADC had its own
issues, it offered some relief to poor single mothers.258 In 1967, Nevada once again was the last
to institute the Federal Work Incentive Program (WIN). Not until the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare (HEW) threatened to withdraw millions of federal funds, did Nevada
offer an employment and training program for welfare recipients. Nevada’s state government
also resisted the Food Stamp program.259 According to Orleck, food stamps spared welfare
recipients from a humiliating experience, as relief money was often used as a political
patronage fund. As late as 1967, rations of surplus food were handed out at the Clark County
courthouse. This staged ritual, designed to perpetuate a debt of gratitude for county
commissioners, left welfare recipients standing in the Las Vegas heat without water or
restrooms. Food stamps offered recipients some dignity and the simple utility of purchasing
nutritious foods, something other than cheese and peanut butter.
Nevada’s fear and loathing of welfare harkened back to the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries when Queen Elizabeth’s Laws were enacted to repress vagrancy and provide a means
to publicly punish sturdy and able beggars in Britain and its colonies. According to Lawrence
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The ADC was created under the Social Security Act of 1935. By 1962, the program included unemployed
fathers, and changed its name to Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).
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A form of hypocrisy prevailed. The program encouraged middle-class women to stay home with their children
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Friedman, in America “the sturdy beggar was one of the (mostly mythical) bogeyman of the
nineteenth century.”260 Thus distinctions between the impotent and able-bodied were made in
order to identify the “idle poor” and keep their hands out of government coffers. The
bogeyman existed well into the 1960s. In 1966, California gubernatorial candidate Ronald
Reagan claimed welfare encouraged poor behavior; it was “pay for play.” Unfortunately, the
exaggerated focus on the few who exploited the welfare system resulted in an undignified
response to the many in need. Politicians and conservatives firmly embraced the ideas of “less
eligibility” and David Ricardo’s “Iron Law of Wages,” which promoted the idea that conditions
for the poor should be worse on welfare than off welfare, and pushed the amount of aid below
subsistence levels for fear welfare would promote dependency.261 Thus, the nineteenth
century mindset that pauperism was a result of laziness, immorality, or some moral defect,
thrived in the Las Vegas heat, through the scrutiny, embarrassment, and stigma of welfare. “In
1967, Congress gave Welfare departments power to remove children of AFDC mothers ‘with
multiple instances of illegitimacy.’”262 Before cases such as King v. Smith (1969), caseworkers
dropped by unannounced and rifled through closets and drawers looking for signs of a man in
the house. According to Ruby Duncan,
Investigators would investigate your home. They would bust in, knock on your door at
midnight and bust in. They were all up in your closet, all under your bed, everywhere,
260
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and you wondered what the world is going on. Your children are being
frightened…That’s why a lot of women began pulling together and saying this has got to
stop.263
The “sturdy beggar” was not alone in disparaging welfare recipients. Maurice Davie in
Negros in American Society (1949) described the “black bogeywoman.” “[The] black mother
spent grocery money on movies and dance halls, where she met men with whom she could
easily have sex. She produced legions of unwanted children, on whom she took out her
frustrations.”264 As Emma Stampley, a poor black woman from the South, argued, “I would
have preferred to have fewer children, but there wasn’t any birth control on the market for
black peoples like they had for whites. There was no place to go.”265 Despite its popular
reputation as a moral wasteland that defied America’s traditional religious values, Las Vegas
was a tough place for women to practice birth control. As a Catholic, Stampley’s doctor refused
to provide her with contraception. Even after Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), a Catholic- and
Mormon-dominated Nevada made it difficult for married women to obtain contraception
advice and devices; unwed women had to wait until 1973. Married women also needed their
husband’s consent to have their tubes tied.266
In A Profile of the Negro American (1964) Thomas Pettigrew blamed black women for
breaking up families, claiming they drove away husbands and damaged the self-esteem of their
sons. Hence the matriarch ruled the roost. Later, the emasculated boys turned to violence to
prove their manhood. So it was Ruby Duncan who defied the prejudiced view of the
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“bogeyman,” the racist myth of the “black bogeywoman” and Nevada’s political ritual of
patronage, when she demanded relief.

Welfare Rights Movement
What they want from Legal Services is our best advice. They don’t come here for me to tell them they
don’t have the capacity to do something. They can make their own assessment as to whether they can
do it.
—Jack Anderson, 1973

“Protests in the streets, and negotiations in the suites,” emphasizes Orleck, “were two
arms of NWRO’s strategy for reforming the welfare system.”267 The National Welfare Rights
Organization (NWRO), with legal advisor none other than former MFY director Ed Sparer,
sought to establish a guaranteed minimum income and eliminate the punitive and humiliating
regulations of welfare. According to Orleck, law students, influenced by Sparer’s ideas, went on
to “blaze new legal paths in the fields of domestic violence, immigration, women’s rights,
health and consumer care, and the rights of the elderly.”268 Many joined the legal services
programs surfacing across the nation to address the poor’s immediate needs.
In 1969, in response to Nevada’s continued reluctance to provide social services for the
poor, Ruby Duncan and a group of Westside mothers formed the Clark County Welfare Rights
Organization (CCWRO), a chapter of the NWRO. That same year, according to historian Eugene
Moehring, "continued segregation in area grade schools, coupled with a relative lack of city and
state funding for Westside poverty programs, led to a full-scale riot." 269 At the time, most black
residents including Ruby Duncan lived in West Las Vegas, where the rioting began. The CCWRO
had formed at a critical time, just as the tide of national politics turned against the poor.
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Governors Nelson Rockefeller in New York and Ronald Reagan in California were currently
investigating welfare fraud and cutting benefits respectively. In 1970, Nevada welfare
administrator George Miller abruptly reduced more than half of the grants going to women and
children receiving welfare. According to legal aid attorney Jack Anderson, “prior to this
action…CCRWO had not grown a great deal…But this was war!”270 CCLS Director Mahlon Brown
agreed to help Ruby Duncan and to represent every family cut off the welfare rolls. Brown
hired Anthony Diamond and fellow Howard Law school graduate Jack Anderson (paid for by the
“Reggie” program), to deal with the flood of termination notices. CCLS filed a class action suit
in Federal District Court, Woods v. Miller (1970). Despite a Temporary Restraining Order, Miller
continued terminations.271 According to Anderson, Mrs. Duncan and the CCWRO responded by
organizing a “campaign such as Nevada had never seen, the NWRO…declared Nevada a welfare
battleground.”272 With hundreds of people accessing CCLS, Anderson and Brown forged
Operation Nevada, “a legal assault on Nevada in the courts, combined with a series of carefully
targeted mass protests designed to bring the state’s economy and government to its knees.”273
The Operation involved an emergency “lawyers brigade” of approximately 40 lawyers and 70
law students led by Ed Sparer. Ronnie Pollack, a lawyer in Goldberg v. Kelly, signed on as cocounsel for Woods. The legal team assisted with requests for hundreds of fair hearings. They
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created a logjam by holding 72 hearings a day, lasting 15 minutes long. Then began the mass
protests,
Hundreds of organizers, legal services attorneys, law students and sympathizers poured
into Nevada. Ruby Duncan, with Dr. Wiley, Ralph Abernathy, Jane Fonda, Florence
Kennedy, Gloria Steinem and David Dellinger at her side, led thousands of protestors on
a march down the Las Vegas Strip in March 1971. [Other famous people included, actor
Donald Sutherland, United Farm Workers leader Cesar Chavez, and Dr. Benjamin Spock.]
The Casinos which had never closed came to a standstill when hundreds of poor women
and children decided to stage eat-ins.274

Duncan used local television to chastise liberal Democratic Governor Mike O’Callaghan for his
“lack of concern” over the 7,500 Nevada welfare recipients hurt by welfare cuts.
Targeted protests by CCWRO, with the help of NWRO and CCLS, led to national media
coverage which put pressure on Nevada’s Welfare division.275 According to Franciscan Father
Louis Vitale, the first priest to be arrested in Nevada, “The city was supposed to be an escape
for people. They didn’t want to come all the way here and be reminded of all the problems of
the 60s and 70s. They didn’t want to face the question of the poor, and blacks.” 276 Shortly after
the march, Judge Roger D. Foley ruled the welfare cuts illegal, and all recipients were
reinstated. According to Mahlon Brown, “It established citizens’ rights to fair hearings in
conflicts with government agencies across the US…from employment security to motor vehicles
it spread across the country.”277 In response to the ruling, Miller and O’Callaghan increased
their scrutiny of welfare fraud. Conservatives in the Nevada assembly pushed for legislation
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that would imprison, for up to ten years, without parole, those engaging in welfare fraud.278
The legislation smacked of the Poor Laws, the “sturdy beggar” and the days of imprisoning the
poor.
Operation Nevada was the last major initiative for Welfare Rights in Nevada. Realizing
that economic, political and legal power could not be separated, Duncan and CCWRO applied
for grants to create a program that effectively addressed the physical and social deterioration
of the Westside. The program offered services for the poor such as daycare, job training,
medical clinics, a variety of counseling, and free breakfasts for children; Mahlon Brown
suggested the name “Operation Life”.279
CCLS continued to work with CCWRO throughout the 1970s. In 1971, CCLS filed a class
action against the Clark County School District (CCSD) to force participation in the National
School Lunch Act. In 1972, Anderson successfully represented Duncan and other Westside
mothers on felony charges after they staged “eat-ins” at the Stardust hotel.280 In 1973, CCLS
helped Operation Life (OL) secure the Old Cove Hotel to house their services. Notably, CCLS
had grown to fourteen employees, including four attorneys and two VISTA attorneys. In April
1973, after prodding from Governor O’ Callaghan, the state legislature finally passed a bill to
fund its share of the federal food stamp program, making Nevada the last state to do so.281
That same year OL opened a Community Health Center, with physicians, nurses, dentists, and
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optometrists providing healthcare for children.282 OL also worked to establish the West Las
Vegas library, and in 1974 brought the first Women, Infants and Children (WIC) program to
Nevada.
During the Mahlon Brown and Jack Anderson period, Operation Life, with help from
CCLS, gave the community food, medical care, a library and a community center. The program
had fought for food stamps, WIC, job training, public service employment, the right to Medicaid
benefits on jobs without medical coverage and more. Through a number of appeals, CCLS had
managed to overturn client disqualifications from AFDC benefits in Miller v. Munger (1972) and
Parson v. Miller (1974); as well as, establish prorated benefits between the Aid to the Blind
program and AFDC in Miller v. West (1972), and secure unemployment benefits after wrongful
terminations in Lellis v. Archie, (1973).283 In 1974 Mahlon Brown III became a Justice of the
Peace, and later served as a US Attorney for Nevada.
By 1976, LSC on a national scale had taken over the OEO-LSP responsibility of funding
legal services programs. That same year CCLS divided into specialty units to offer services
through a senior law project, a lawyer referral service, a welfare law unit, and housing and
consumer sections. Notable litigation cases at the time involved wrongful seizure of a tenant’s
property, Adams v. Sanson Inv. Co. (1974), pretrial detention conditions, Bishop v. State of
Nevada (1976), attempts to block welfare cuts, Coby v. Miller (1977), and a revision to asset
requirements for welfare eligibility in Brey v. Miller.
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Ruby Duncan served as Operation Life’s Executive Director until 1990. She successfully
brought in tens of millions of federal dollars to Nevada through: WIC, EPSDT, food stamps and
other economic development grants. Duncan also served as Vice Chair of the Clark County
Democratic Party, which gave her critical access to Governor O’Callaghan, Harry Reid, Howard
Cannon, State Senator Floyd Lamb and other Democratic luminaries. In addition, President
Carter appointed her to his National Advisory Council on Economic Opportunity in 1979.
Together, CCLS and Duncan represented the poor, but not in the traditional sense; this time the
poor found the venues available to articulate their needs and make their own demands. CCLS,
like so many other legal services programs in the 1970s, "promoted the distinctive treatment of
the poor by state" by helping to turn poverty into "an officially sanctioned, routinely
administered legal status."284
Another program that emerged in the 1970s, the Nevada Indian Legal Services (NILS),
helped provide legal assistance to Native Americans. According to AnnaMarie Johnson, “When
[President] Johnson included the idea of free legal assistance for the poor…Native Americans
were probably the segment of the population with the greatest poverty and the greatest lack of
access to justice.”285 Incorporated in March 1973, NILS began providing legal services for Tribal
members. Until that time, none of the federal money Indians received was for legal aid.

Nevada Indian Legal Services
When I leave an Indian Community I nearly always leave depressed. —Dr. William Carmack286
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Self-determination for Indians began well before President Nixon’s message on Indian
policy reform in 1970. The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, which incorporated significant
portions of the US Bill of Rights to Indians and their lands, and the Indian Self-Determination
and Education Assistance Act of 1975, which administered funds and grants to Indian tribes,
were responses to the Indian unity movement that included rising Indian activism in the 1960s.
Some Indians, like other minority groups, habitually fought white assimilation—they fought for
identity. The vicious circle of racism, harassment, unemployment, and underground attempts
to escape poverty economically, via illegal trade, or psychologically via addiction, were both
producers and products of poverty. Native Americans were pushed onto reservations that
could not sustain their earlier ways of life nor provide a life without poverty.
At the time, the Nevada Indian Agency managed federal Indian money and
expenditures, but Nevada Governor Paul Laxalt wanted control of all federal funds in his state.
At Lake Tahoe in 1969, the National Council on Indian Opportunity (NCIO) held a Federal-State
Indian Affairs Conference. Chair of the NCIO, Vice President Spiro Agnew, was also the newly
appointed Commissioner of Indian Affairs. Laxalt submitted his proposal to make state
agencies responsible for managing federal funds. He argued against the Indian Agency, which
managed a payroll of approximately $750,000 annually. It was his position that the agency was
“accounting for far too great a share of the tax dollar appropriated for the Indian.” 287
Considering Nevada’s conservative stance on welfare at the time (as Ruby Duncan and
so many others experienced), having state control over Indian money seemed self-defeating.
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“In my State, the Indians are opposed to an attempt by a State to assume jurisdiction on Indian
Affairs,” said John Rainer of New Mexico. “We hear recognition of the Indian problems in the
States of Arizona and Utah and New Mexico and other places, but I have not heard one
delegate saying that the State is willing to spend a dollar to cure these problems.” 288
In 1973, Charles Zeh, Executive Director of the Washoe County Legal Aid Society
(WCLAS), created Nevada Indian Legal Services (NILS). Located in Carson City, the new program
fell under the umbrella of WCLAS. At the time, WCLAS received federal grants from LSP, CETA
(the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act), and money from Washoe County filing fees
from civil cases. According to Zeh, his work began when he signed up with the Reno Indian
Athletic Association to play fast-pitch softball. He described his involvement as a “feet on the
ground” affair: by being in the company of fellow sportsmen, their friends and families, he
began to hear of the many legal problems facing Nevada Indians. As an attorney he felt
fortunate to be able to help with divorces, repossessions, landlord tenant problems, and other
legal issues.289 With no state funds in Nevada to help Indians, NILS provided legal aid with
grants from LSP and then LSC. The Indian program operated for only nine years before LSC
forced a merger.

The Merger
The LSC Act of 1974 provided three programs in Nevada with federal funds for legal
services, Clark County Legal Services (CCLS), Washoe Legal Services (WLS), and NILS.290 Don
Pope, who started as a VISTA volunteer in 1973, served as the next Executive Director of
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NILS.291 Current Justice of the Peace and former Reno Mayor Pete Sferrazza continued Zeh’s
and Pope’s work as director from 1976 to 1978, followed by Fred Lee as director in 1979 until
the program’s merger.292 Just prior to the merger and in response to LSC funding for rural
populations, NILS changed its name to Nevada Indian-Rural Legal Services (NIRLS) in 1981. That
year—Reagan’s first year in office—LSC officials chose to visit Nevada and inspect the LSCfunded programs. During their “visit”, LSC charged NIRLS program officials with poor
management and use of LSC funds. Based on an account by Carolyn Worrell (an LSC grant
manager at the time), LSC received multiple complaints from NIRLS’s staff. Worrell emphasized
how inadequate funds limited the basic core of services and stifled the program. At the time,
LSC officials were pushing states into consolidating organizations with the idea that centralized
administration would be cost effective—Reagan’s 25% cut in funding for FY1982 was fast
approaching. In a separate visit to the CCLS program, LSC uncovered a history of “financial
irregularities” from the office bookkeeper. Without Director N.N. Singh’s knowledge, large
amounts of money were unaccounted for. With added operational control and the power to
require reports, record keeping, and financial audits of grantees, LSC established ample illegal
activity at CCLS, and unsatisfactory management at NIRLS—giving Reagan’s appointees the
leverage they needed to consolidate the two programs. Why wasn’t WLS forced to merge?
“The regional office didn’t have the goods on them,” recalled Worrell.293 So evidently, unable
to find fault with WLS, the Reagan-packed board of LSC decided the merger would have to
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happen without them. Sasser described LSC’s stick-first-then-carrot approach. “Merge or else,
we are going to basically fire all of you,” recalls Sasser, “pull all the money out from your boards
and put together another program.”294 LSC then encouraged the deal by offering additional
money from a state support grant.295 The merger allowed the new regional office to utilize
Indian money to service the rural non-Indian population and expand its coverage of legal
services. At the time of the merger, only the Indian office covered the rural areas: this included
all Nevada counties except for Washoe and Clark, which were served by WLS and CCLS
respectively.296 (Due to geography, CCLS also served Nye County).
Described as a “shotgun” wedding, in 1982, CCLS and NIRLS merged to become a new
statewide program, Nevada Legal Services.297

Nevada Legal Services
Our goal at Nevada Legal Services is obviously to assist our clients in the best manner possible and
provide the highest quality of legal services that we can.
—Rhea Gertken, NLS Directing Attorney, 2014

NLS began just as President Reagan’s cutbacks hit legal services programs across the
nation. By now, LSC had shifted the focus of the earlier LSP from quality to one of observation
and training. It was evident that the “strings attached to federal funding under the Legal
Services Program were minor compared to LSC’s oversight.”298 Ironically, with the new state
support grant, NLS was one of the few programs to operate with increased funding. Carolyn
294
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Worrell, who had headed LSC’s Quality Improvement Program in Washington D.C., became the
first Executive Director.299 She used the state support grant to hire Sasser as the Coordinator of
Litigation and Training and staff attorneys John Morrell and future Nevada Supreme Court
Justice Michael Douglas for the new program.300
As a statewide program, NLS formed task forces in public benefits, housing and Indian
law. Did the new merger hurt the access to justice for Native Americans? According to NIRLS
staff attorney Dick Olson the merger involved many heated board meetings. The hard-core
Indian law staff was very concerned that the services to Indians and tribal organizations would
suffer; especially considering the size disparity between CCLS, which was larger and more
powerful than the smaller Indian Legal program. “The LSC was bludgeoning all programs into
consolidating,” stated Olson, “LSC wanted one program per state to deal with.”301 Staff
concerns were not unfounded: NIRLS’ Winnemucca and Elko offices were closed down, leading
to a reduction in services. According to Worrell, the merger benefitted Nevada Indians. She
explained that “with the larger program, the administrative costs are shared, which means
more resources can go into services; …absolutely, I think the merger increased services.”302 NLS
did keep an Indian Law component, but as Kim Robinson, an NLS staff attorney for the Indian
Law Project, added “what was lost in the process was the board of directors which was made
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up of people who were trying to direct the program to meet the local needs of the
Indians…now we have maybe one Native American on the statewide board.”303 Currently, NLS
has no Native American on its board.
After the merger, with shared overhead and added resources, the statewide program
secured many favorable changes in the rules and regulations of the institutions and agencies
their clients relied upon. Although the Reagan board soon moved to restrict these activities, it
was still possible for programs such as NLS to actively engage the Nevada legislature. Based on
Sasser’s account,
The program was instrumental in having benefit levels for the Aid to Dependent
Children program raised from a low of $199 a month for a family of three in 1983 to
$348 by 1992. In 1985, major revisions to the Landlord/Tenant Act and legislation
authorizing Pro Se TROs in domestic violence cases were passed. In 1987 uniform
standards and judicial review for county medically indigent programs were enacted.
1989 saw the creation of the Low Income Housing Trust Fund and the defeat of a bill to
overturn the Newkirk decision.304

NLS also engaged in a number of class actions which struck down excessive public housing
charges and rent (Brown v. Housing Authority of the City of Las Vegas & Ortiz v. Housing
Authority of the City of Las Vegas), secured welfare benefits of recipients involved in personal
injury settlements (Johnson v. Nevada State Welfare Division), prevented automatic denial of
general assistance to those deemed “employable” (Clark County Social Serv. Dep't v. Newkirk),
and blocked general cuts in ADC benefits (Adams v. Griepentrog). Taking test cases to the
Nevada Supreme Court, NLS lawyers expanded due process for housing tenants facing summary
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eviction.305 The Nevada Supreme Court also favorably settled case-by-case appeals involving
unemployment compensation.306
In 1985, Worrell handed leadership over to Wayne Pressel, the second Executive
Director of NLS. During the 1970s and 1980s, many distinguished Nevadans served on the NLS
board, including Nevada Supreme Court Justices Bill Maupin, Michael Cherry and Nancy Becker,
as well as Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Judge, Johnnie Rawlinson.
According to Sasser, for the first half of the 1990s, NLS continued to make “significant
progress in the courts, the legislature and in community advocacy.”307 In the early 1990s, the
organization enjoyed a number of victories.
In 1991, the Low Income Housing Trust Fund was created using an increase of 10 cents
for each $500 of value in the real estate transfer tax, which in SFY ’08 generated $13.3
million. Also, the largest ADC increase was passed raising the grant temporarily to $367
per month…The Governor was persuaded to veto a bill allowing evictions with 3 day
notice from weekly tenants…The 1993 legislature required that 15% of redevelopment
authority funds in Las Vegas be set aside for low income housing.308
These achievements in the 1980s and 1990s exemplify why restrictions on lobbying are so
detrimental to the poor.
Successful class action suits required the Welfare Division to make decisions on ADC and
Medicaid applications within 45 days, (Hamilton, et al. v Griepentrog, et al.), raised a
reasonable defense that vocational schools failed to offer meaningful educations to student
loan recipients, (Hernandez, et al. v. Alexander, et al. ), forced libraries to accept homeless
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patrons (Southern Nevada Homeless Coalition v. Clark County Library Board), and successfully
sued a large landlord for locking tenants out without due process (Meyer v. Eighth Judicial
District Court). NLS also took appeals to the Nevada Supreme Court to successfully argue that
disqualification from unemployment compensation due to misconduct must be based on an
element of wrongfulness, Kolnik v. The Nevada Empl. Sec. Dept. (1996), and there was a right of
appeal from summary eviction notices, Lippis v. Peters (1996). Some of the examples proved
that case-by-case successes can also change the law to benefit Nevada’s poor population as a
whole.
“Spin-off”

The last year NLS could lobby and bring class actions on behalf of the poor was 1995.
“That’s when we, in Nevada restructured legal services so that CCLS and WLS would have no
LSC money,” Wayne Pressel recalled, “to insulate a couple of the established organizations to
do reform work.”309 Effective January 1, 1996, in response to increased restrictions, CCLS, like
other programs across the nation, “spun off” its LSC-funded program.310 NLS staff member
Barbara Buckley, who successfully ran for the Nevada Assembly and later served as the first
female speaker, became the Executive Director of CCLS the following year. What began as a
legal aid society in 1958 would continue on as CCLS in 1996 and later become the Legal Aid
Center of Southern Nevada [2008], with NLS giving CCLS rights to the civil filing fee money in
order to fund them. According to Pressel,
that was my major career decision in legal services…I virtually gutted Nevada Legal
Services and gave the guts to Barbara…and I would stay with the dead-imperiled half309
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living, walking dead...She took the best lawyers, all the equipment, took the library, took
all the machines, took anything she wanted, and let me do the rest. She was going to do
reform work.311
By the year 2000, NLS had operated for four years, adjusting to major LSC restrictions.
NLS had two main offices in Las Vegas and Carson City, as well as two lawyers in Reno. Carson
City handled outreach and rural cases in Northern Nevada. The offices closed a combined 476
cases. The majority of cases involved either Brief Service or Counsel and Advice (CNA), with
approximately 54 percent housing, 21 percent income maintenance and 10 percent consumer
issues. NLS provided a multitude of services in categories such as housing, (mostly dealing with
Federal Subsidized Housing or landlord/tenant), income maintenance, (mostly involving SSI,
Unemployment Compensation and Food Stamps), consumer, (predominately involving
collections, repossessions and garnishments), family, (involving mostly divorce, separation or
annulments), health, (Medicaid), and miscellaneous issues (including wills and estates, and
Indian/Tribal law).312 Clearly, the depth and quality of service had been affected. After 1996,
the majority of cases involved only brief service and advice.
In 2000 NLS expanded its services by adding a Self-Help Center (at the Clark County
Family Court) and a Tenant’s Rights Center. In 2003, NLS opened an office in Reno, and a
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satellite workplace in Elko. Thanks largely to Las Vegas, between 2000 and 2010 Nevada led the
nation in growth, as its population soared 35 percent from 2 million to 2.7 million people.
Nevada added its second congressional seat in 1983, a third in 2003, and a fourth in 2010.
During the decade, NLS grew in response to Nevada’s economic growth and the flood of new
residents, including many impoverished migrants seeking employment. NLS dealt with a tide of
clients as it responded to Nevada’s population “boom” and a greater wave of clients after an
unforeseen “bust”.
Boom and Bust
In the 1970s environmental historian

Donald Worster warned of an American ethos

that bred unbridled optimism.313 The ethos stemmed from an upward mobile society bent
on the inevitability of progress and “getting ahead”. In a laissez-faire market, without a
check on this ethos, disasters such as the Dust Bowl, speculations such as the Dotcom
“bubble,” and economic recessions and depressions were unavoidable.314
Just as the dotcom recession was ending, a widespread and overly optimistic
perception of home values based on an unrealistic view of America’s future, created a
housing “bubble.” Peaking in 2006, the bubble collapsed, spawning a credit crisis. As a
result, the nation plummeted into a severe recession from 2007 to 2009. Harvard’s State of
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the Nation Housing report (funded by the Ford Foundation) summarized the subprime
mortgage debacle that inflated the bubble,
In the hope of higher returns, lenders extended credit to borrowers previously unable to
qualify for loans. Subprime mortgages rose from only 8 percent of originations in 2003 to 20
percent in 2005 and 2006, while the interest-only and payment-option share shot up from
just 2 percent in 2003 to 20 percent in 2005.315

Predatory lenders offered interest-only and balloon payment mortgages, which saddled
borrowers with expensive and inflated mortgages.316 The cycle of relaxed lending increased
the supply of borrowers, which increased demand and artificially drove house prices upward.
Overpriced housing with stagnant pay scales and general wages left many borrowers “house
poor”, with little to no money left after making their monthly mortgage payments. Thus the
general economy suffered. Predatory lending left the state of economy unsustainable.317
The collapse of the housing bubble hit Nevadans especially hard. One article mused
that the desert metropolis of Las Vegas suddenly found itself underwater. According to an
article in the American Bankruptcy Journal, “Filings in Nevada increased at a faster rate than in
nearly every other state from 2006-10 (+446 percent).”318 As historian Eugene Moehring
observed, by the Spring of 2009 “land values valley-wide had crashed, falling by 74 percent
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from their all-time high just a few years earlier.”319 By May 2010 Nevada’s unemployment rate
reached a high of 14.2 percent. The Las Vegas Review-Journal reported that Nevada led the
nation in unemployment. As Chief Economist with the state Department of Employment,
Training and Rehabilitation, Bill Anderson noted, “If you’d asked me two years ago, when
Nevada had essentially been the fastest-growing state in the nation for two decades running,
one couldn’t have imagined that things would deteriorate this far.”320 LSC’s 2009 Justice Gap
revealed the problems legal services programs such as NLS were seeing; “the current economic
crisis, with its attendant problems of high unemployment, home foreclosures and family stress,
has resulted in legal problems relating to consumer credit, housing, employment, bankruptcies,
domestic violence and child support, and has pushed many families into poverty for the first
time.”321 According to a report by UNLV’s Center of Democratic Culture,
In 2009, about 3% of the Clark County population (52,458 people) was homeless at
some time during the year. 85% of mortgage holders in Las Vegas have negative equity
in their homes. Housing permits in Southern Nevada have dropped from a peak of
39,012 permits in 2005 to a 30-year low of 5,734 in 2009. Some 40% of Nevadans are
renters, ranking the state 47th in the nation.322
Just as Donald Worster warned over thirty years earlier, if left unchecked, the American ethos
would lead to economic disasters and environmental catastrophes. Countless foreclosures left
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backyard pools in Las Vegas green with algae—at a time when the West Nile Virus was declared
endemic.323
Unemployment greatly increased Las Vegas’ poor population, forcing NLS to work
harder than ever. In 2000 it closed 476 cases; by 2010 the number jumped to 7,681 cases. The
greatest shift in casework involved private landlord/tenant issues. In 2000 landlord/tenant
represented 23.5 percent of NLS casework; by 2005 it rose to 30.9 percent. In 2009
landlord/tenant amounted to 58.1 percent of casework, and rose to 60.3 percent by 2010.
Interestingly, the rise in landlord/tenant issues in 2005 can be attributed to the economic
boom. In 2005, the unemployment rate hit a low of 3.9 percent. With employment comes
more demand for rental housing. This demand pushes rents higher, which leads to increased
evictions for the poor; oftentimes unlawfully. The demand and pricing for rent typically drops
during economic slumps, but this was not the case in Nevada, much less in Las Vegas. Indeed,
the housing crisis pushed many previous homeowners onto the “renters” market. NLS
therefore dealt with an even greater number of landlord/tenant issues. In 2007, 8.5 percent
of cases involved divorce and separation, becoming NLS’s third top issue. Unemployment
Compensation (6.9 percent) and collections/repossessions/garnishments (4.0 percent) reached
the top third and fifth spots respectively in 2009. By 2010, Unemployment Compensation
accounted for 7.5 percent of casework, while collections totaled 3.2 percent.
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We Do What We Can

NLS celebrated its 30th anniversary in 2012. NLS merged at a time when the state’s
entire population was less than 600,000; by 2012, about 2 million people lived in the Las Vegas
Valley alone. NLS grew in response to Nevada’s population of impoverished residents in need
of legal services. According to the 2010 census, 41% of Nevadans were living at poverty levels.
“Between 2008 and 2012,” AnnaMarie Johnson recalled that “we went from a staff of 29 to a
staff of 45.”324 In response, NLS offered a multitude of programs to serve all seventeen
counties of the state as well as specific populations: the Indian Law Project served 23 Indian
reservations; the Low Income Taxpayer Clinic helped clients with IRS tax issues, (most
surprisingly, Nevada had the highest number of Pro Se litigants in tax court in the nation); NLS
also revived its Pro Bono Program in 2008.325 During her 30th anniversary presentation, NLS
Executive Director Johnson reiterated the need for legal services in Nevada,
We do what we can…We lost some LSC funding in 2012…but we’re tightening our belt
and getting by…we’re doing what we can through our direct representation and through
all of the various programs and clinics that we have, but still the need is great.326
In the sense that access to justice means providing an attorney for a client, NLS
attorneys and advocates have, from 2000 to present, handled well over 61,000 cases, helping
over 136,000 household members. They have also provided services for over 1.3 million people
with non-case matters.327 Since NLS revived its Pro Bono program in 2008, over 1,612 cases
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have been accepted. NLS recovered approximately $7.75 million for clients through help with
probate, divorce, bankruptcy, costs associated with a private attorney, and other benefits.
Notable cases by NLS involved clarifying Native American rights in In re Phillip A.C. (2006), and
State Engineer v. S. Fork Band of the Te-Moak Tribe (2000), reinterpreting unemployment
compensation in favor of those disabled on the job, Anderson v. State Employ. Sec. Div. (2014),
and enforcing legitimate SSI claims, Bohland v Barnhart, (2002).

Employees
The NLS-related cases mentioned, required the efforts of attorneys Raymond Rodriguez,
Jon Sasser, David Olshan, Barbara Buckley, Dan Wulz, Jordan Savage, and Heather AndersonFintak, to name a few. It is important to remember that NLS employees and employees of all
legal services programs provide the service. From the “Reggie” programs, back-up centers and
legal aid programs across the nation employees who produced law reform and represented
clients before the courts made the programs effective. “Of all the decisions made by the
director of the board of a local agency,” asserts Earl Johnson, “none ranks in importance with
the selection of the staff attorneys—the operating personnel who deliver the service to the
customer.”328 AnnaMarie Johnson, who began her role as Deputy Director of NLS in 2006,
recognizes that a quality program requires a good staff. “This is a truly wonderful staff that we
have. They’re dedicated, they’ve had the opportunity—I know there have been people out
there trying to poach them away—but they stay and they do a great job.”329 Many outstanding
attorneys choose public over corporate interest.
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Access to Justice
Legal Services still plays an important role in combatting poverty. As part of a network
of legal services providers, LSC-funded programs comprise an integral part of today’s
patchwork-way of providing a civil Gideon. Nevertheless, a significant justice gap remains in
the provision of civil legal services. Federal funding involves regulation that ultimately limits
the scope of client services. NLS provides services that help the poor in their fight against
poverty, but with LSC restrictions and regulations, it cannot provide them with the kind of
access to justice envisioned at its inception.330 Do LSC restrictions limit access to justice? “Yes,”
responds Carolyn Worrell, “until a Legal Services attorney can provide the same kind of
representation that private attorneys can, it does limit it.”331 When Justice Douglas began his
work as a staff attorney for NLS in 1982, his goal was to provide legal resource for people who
couldn’t afford an attorney, there were no restrictions. “What does that do?” he asked, “It
gives those individuals, full rights to citizenship. If you’re in a position, where you can’t afford
to attain an attorney, you’re not a full citizen, because what you have to do to defend yourself
is deemed criminal in most cases.”332
Houseman and Perle spoke of a “diminished capacity” for legal services, but the real
problem lies in the fact that without class action suits and legislative advocacy, NLS can never
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prevent the practices and legislative acts that perpetuate poverty. Oftentimes legal problems
would best be answered by a class action suit, because the source of the problem affects
multiple clients. Without class actions and legislation that champions the poor, illegal business
practices, harmful rules and regulations, slum lords and other factors will continue to exploit
the poor. Other conditions also narrow access. “The restriction that by far had the most
impact,” noted Worrell, “was denying the programs the ability to request attorney’s fees,
because that frequently was a very important negotiating tool. When we lost that, it was like
one hand tied behind our back.”333 Court decisions frequently resulted in capped or limited
monetary penalties. By adding attorney’s fees, the cost of losing a case increased dramatically.
Increased costs acted as a deterrent for opposing counsel—they had much more to lose. Legal
Services programs also benefitted from the additional funds earned by fee generating cases.334
The culmination of restrictions on class actions, legislative advocacy, and attorney’s fees were
exacerbated by restrictions on non-LSC funds. According to Worrell, “Attorney’s fees restriction
and the fact that the restrictions apply not just too legal services funding but to any funding
that an LSC program receives…was a very heinous restriction.”335 The work CCLAS, CCLS and
NLS did on reform prior to 1996 was more effective, held greater depth, and was more
beneficial than just access to justice. “The shift went from OEO, which was reform, to total
access to justice meaning that we have legal aid, omnipresent, doing much less for everybody,”
remarked Wayne Pressel, “You kind of went from being the Stanford ‘Think Tank’ for new
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medical breakthroughs and made it into Medicare. So it had a value, but it's remembered, now
it's Medicare.”336
Conservatives in Congress, attacks from the far right, the ABA’s willingness to concede,
and LSC’s coercion, have made access to justice what it is today—a passing of responsibility to
the private sector, narrowing of the passage to the courts, and restrictions that perpetuate
poverty and injustice. As Pressel observed, “back then, legal services would have been front
and center in foreclosure work, we'd be front and center in equal pay for women, and front and
center in minimum wage.”337

Casualties of War
“In every period, society makes some attempt to care for its weaker members.” ~ Lawrence Friedman,
2005

When asked if he joined legal services to fight the War on Poverty, Justice Douglas
replied, “No, I was there to provide legal representation for those who couldn’t, plain and
simple.”338 He described his experience,
People would come and see me…I’d say where are you living? They’d say I’m living in my
car. It was July; it was over 100 degrees out there. So you have a man and a woman
and their two small kids living in their damn car. If you have any kind of sensibility, you
realize their entitled to something. I don’t think you have to start out as being a
crusader, but if you believe people deserve a fair shot, yeah, it gets to you real quick. I
didn’t start as a crusader; it became a crusade because of the injustices that were being
done.339

There still exist leaders in Nevada who believe in the earlier initiatives of OEO; indeed,
they are still fighting a war on poverty. Although the language has changed, former NLS
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Executive Directors Worrell and Pressel, Executive Director of the Legal Aid Center of Southern
Nevada, Barbara Buckley, and others such as Jon Sasser, Justice Douglas and Executive Director
AnnaMarie Johnson each fight poverty in their own way. “Part of the outrage over the
restrictions,” argues Worrell, “is that Legal Services attorneys are frequently seen as Private
Attorneys General…we help to enforce the law.”340
Excuse me bad debt collection firm, you screw up and we’re going to come after you
under the Fair Debt Collection Act which provides treble damages for clients and
attorney’s fees for attorneys. So when private attorneys won’t take those cases, then
the legal services programs can and will. And so again, it’s the Private Attorney General
concept rather than talking about getting people out of poverty…Hopefully the end
result is the same.
Jon Sasser is currently involved in legislative advocacy, providing a voice for the poor during
legislative sessions. Barbara Buckley heads the Legal Aid Center, whose mission is “dedicated
to providing civil legal services to the most vulnerable in our community.” Johnson and her
staff do what they can to provide the best legal services available. Justice Douglas co-chairs the
Access to Justice Commission, which works to coordinate legal services in the state. Pressel is
now a private attorney, but his practice closely parallels legal services. His work in foreclosure
focuses on the long-term plan and ultimate wealth of the client. Rather than keep clients in
refinanced, overpriced, and underwater mortgages, Pressel suggests clients defer payments
and put their mortgage money into savings. Of course the client will lose their home, but not
until Pressel forestalls the foreclosure process for years, giving his clients enough time to obtain
a reasonably priced home with their savings. The escape from being house-poor results in less
debt, increased long-term wealth, and more money for a life plan. In short, all these advocates
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for the poor use the law to fight for clients in unemployment, housing and consumer cases,
which ultimately becomes an extra-legal issue of money and quality of survival.
During their work with LSC-funded programs, these veterans of legal aid often came to
loggerheads with the increased regulations. Some continued working within the regulations as
best they could, while others opted out of using LSC funds altogether. Some fought the
regulations and managed to skirt vague restrictions; some simply moved on; while others
fought and lost. Since 1969, all legal aid advocates have had to cope with budget cuts,
restrictions, and other roadblocks to quality thrown up by staunch conservatives, many of
whom have no fondness for legal aid. The Nixon Administration worked to disband the OEO
and eliminate law reform activities. The Reagan Board managed to cut funding and successfully
end the “Reggie” program. The Republican Revolution bought an end to Support Centers in
1996—the very centers designed to provide legal services—without which programs lacked
training, dexterity and know-how to provide effective access to justice for the poor.
Eliminating successful and contentious leaders of legal aid on a national, state and local
level was also an effective tactic in curtailing the value of legal services in general, a sort of
culling of the herd, if you will. Vice President Spiro Agnew forced the resignation of Fred
Speaker. Howard Phillips fired LSP Directors Terry Lezner and 1969 “Reggie” recipient Ted
Tetzlaff, and Deputy Director Frank Jones. On June 1, 1984, Marttie L. Thompson, Director of
LSC’s regional office in Philadelphia resigned, citing “a ‘cumulative’ series of actions by the
corporation’s management, which…hampered his effectiveness and harmed the ‘interest of the
poor.’”341 Thompson simply grew tired of the way LSC treated legal aid programs, barring their
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advocates from talking to news organizations and “raiding” programs’ budges and rummaging
through their files in search of supposed misconduct. How many others were fired or pressured
to resign? In 2008, Pressel was fired from NLS.
Wayne Pressel

Used as a buzzword, “Manhattanization” described the burgeoning development of
high-rises in Las Vegas. During the boom, developers looked to promote their condo
investments by locating them on or near Las Vegas Boulevard. Close to downtown Fremont
Street, the “condo craze” included projects such as the Juhl, Manhattan, Newport and Ogden.
The land NLS occupied at 530 S. 6th St. was close enough to the Strip to be included in such a
high-rise development. In 2006, a developer approached NLS. Realizing property values were
extremely high, Pressel and the NLS board agreed to sell the building. Unfortunately for the
developer, an adjacent property included in the plan, was tied up in litigation. The time needed
to resolve the issue, required the developer to extend the contract with NLS. Ultimately, after
multiple extensions, NLS received a total of $300,000 in earnest money from a failed sale.
Although the windfall went back into the NLS program, Pressel allocated the money as
unrestricted non-LSC funds. In response, LSC claimed he stole the money. Pressel argued that
the NLS building, which earned the earnest money, was originally purchased with non-LSC
funds prior to 1995, so the money was not connected to an LSC source.
The collapse of the United States housing bubble and the ensuing Great Recession from
December 2007 to June 2009 brought more scrutiny of U.S. government spending. As a result,
Congress closely watched the practices of LSC and its grantee-recipient programs across the
nation. The Office of Compliance and Enforcement (OCE) and the Office of Inspector General
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reviewed and audited various grantees, including NLS, for compliance and performance. In
2008, prior to a full investigation into allegations of wrongdoing, members of LSC’s OCE held a
meeting with NLS Board members. With unsubstantiated claims, LSC transferred its pressure
from Congress to NLS Board members. With innuendos suggesting embezzlement, NLS board
members terminated Executive Director Wayne Pressel. Described by Pressel as a prolonged
and expensive “witchhunt,” LSC investigated its own misappropriation of funds claim and found
no monies unaccounted for. After 23 years of service, without fanfare or salute, Pressel was
unceremoniously fired from NLS, although no wrongdoing was ever found. Clearly, the
termination was politically motivated.
According to Pressel, his departure from Nevada Legal Services began much earlier
when Congress started increasing restrictions in 1996. Although at odds with the restrictions,
Pressel stayed with NLS. As an attorney who supported the War on Poverty, he was reluctant to
give up the fight and continued to look for ways to use restricted funding to help the poor. “I
was always trying to slowly find ways out,” Pressel recalled, “And that's what really brought
about my demise... [LSC] hated me when I was there. That was because I kept on pushing the
limits.” Pressel found ways to increase access to justice by using creative means to sidestep
regulations,
I would say that we could provide legal assistance without income determination
because we were only providing counsel and advice, and there was a loophole that said
that when you provided counsel and advice as opposed to brief service on a case that
you didn't have to take an income determination. So I set up this huge counsel and
advice telephone system…just to circumvent… and it made them…crazy.342
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Pressel, like other attorneys during the War on Poverty days, reminds us that the caring
and dedication of those carrying the tattered banner of reform extends far beyond shuffling
clients through the courts. Access to justice meant something different; it meant equality for
the poor among society. Pressel’s fervor for reform and his ultimate departure from legal
services begs the question, without all of the government restrictions, how effective could NLS
be in providing full equality rather than mere access to justice for the poor?
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